This dissertation examines voluntary disclosure behavior in the China A-share initial public offering (IPO) market. It analyzes how underwriter reputation and ownership structure influence the extent of voluntary disclosure in IPO prospectus. Based on the data of 375 Chinese IPO firms from 2004 to 2008, the empirical findings show an interesting phenomenon: hiring underwriters of China Securities Regulatory Commission’s (CSRC) highly rated securities companies is negatively related to the extent of voluntary disclosure in IPO prospectus, but hiring foreign-shared securities companies as underwriters is positively linked to higher levels of the voluntary disclosure level in the IPO prospectus. The findings also show a significantly negative relation between state-owned enterprises (SOE) and the extent of voluntary disclosure in the IPO prospectus. This study is among the first to investigate the incentives, such as underwriter reputation and ownership structure, on the supply level of voluntary disclosure in the IPO prospectus in China. Examination of CSRC rating of securities underwriters against Sino-foreign joint venture underwriters on voluntary disclosure in the IPO prospectus contributes to a better understanding of how government intervention distorts the information environment of the IPO market. It also helps to understand the SOE voluntary disclosure behavior in the IPO process when the government is both the ruler and a player in the market. This study is valuable for both domestic and global investors who would like to gain more knowledge of the Chinese IPO market.