有权力就有责任，没有责任的权力是危险的，从这个意义上来说责任是权力正常运行的保障。相对司法权而言，司法责任制固然能够起到制止和防止司法权滥用的效果，但司法责任制作为一种外在力量，对审判权的行使主体会形成一种逆刺激。过度的司法责任制会对法官的心理产生压力，进而影响法官的思维和判断。而法官独立的思维和中立的判断是法官独立行使审判权的前提和基础，是作为司法公正之基石的法官独立和法官中立的核心内容。显然，过度的司法责任制会影响甚至会动摇司法公正的基石。

过度的司法责任制意味着司法责任制存在限度。本论文以此为论点，结合中国正在进行的司法改革，对中国司法责任制的限度问题进行了论证。本论文除导论和结语外共分四章展开。

第一章在透析中国司法责任制的产生和发展的历史嬗变过程后发现这样一种现象：即中国司法责任制与中国的司法改革相伴而生，是中国司法去行政化的结果，司法责任制改革本身就是中国司法改革的一项内容。在中国司法改革的背景下，中国的司法责任制承载着司法去行政化后对审判进行管理和监督的职能，结果责任、全面责任和终身责任正是中国司法责任制这种管理和监督职能的外化和展开。而也正是中国司法责任制的这三个特征，使得中国司法责任制呈现出以惩戒为主要特质的并在某种程度上表现为无限度的司法责任制性状，这种司法责任制形式笔者称之为“惩戒型司法责任制模式”。在本章中，笔者着重对中国惩戒型司法责任制模式的原因律进行了深入的探究：中国的司法责任制之所以是惩戒型，受中国古代司法责任制的影响是一个方面，中国现代司法信用危机的应激性需求也是一个重要因素，但最为重要的是中国以司法长官负责制为核心的司法行政化审判管理体制产生的路径依赖。

第二章主要对域外国家的司法责任制特别是西方法治国家的司法责任制进行了比较研究。事实上，西方国家并没有像中国这样严格意义上的司法责任制，也不像中国的司法责任制那样具有浓重的火药味，以法官责任豁免为基础的司法惩戒制度是西方国家司法责任制的主体内容，因而西方法治国家的司法责任制是豁免型的司法责任制。从法官责任豁免制度发展历史来看，法官责任豁免经历了从绝对豁免到相对责任豁免的演变过程，豁免的内容一般包括民事责任豁免和刑事责任豁免两方面的内容。现代西方法治国家的法官责任豁免一般都包括这两方面的内容，只是程度不同而已。法官责任豁免的目的在于通过维护司法独立和确保法官中立进而实现司法公正，也正因为如此，司法独立和法官中立是豁免型司法责任制的政治基石。西方法治国家司法责任制的另一个内容就是司法惩戒。在西方法治国家，法官行为的适当性是衡量法官是否受到惩戒的唯一标准，这个标准既是行为标准，又是伦理标准，是以伦理标准来衡量法官行为是否适当的行为标准，但绝对不是结果标准，更不可能是错案标准。也就是说，司法惩戒的对象是法官的行为而不可能是司法的结果，法官不能也不会因自己的裁判结果的争议甚至是错误而受到惩戒，这正是豁免型司法责任制的灵魂之所在。不仅如此，基于对司法独立和法官中立的维护，豁免型司法责任制还设立了司法禁区，对直接关于判决或程序裁决的实质性问题的指控，司法惩戒组织不予受理，对可能影响司法独立、法官中立的事实认定、司法裁决等司法核心行为排除在司法惩戒之外。显然，法官责任豁免制度存在和司法惩戒禁区制度的设立表明，西方法治国家司法责任制是存在限度的。

第三章从探寻惩戒型司法责任制和豁免型司法责任制两种责任制形式赖以生存的制度环境入手，发现惩戒型司法责任制寄生于科层型司法公正实现模式之中，而豁免型司法责任制则与中立型司法公正形式模式相契合。在全面解析科层型司法公正实现模式和中立型司法公正实现模式的内在机理的基础上，重点分析了两种司法公正实现模式相互融合的动因和趋向，并由此得出与之相耦合的两种司法责任制形式必然也会相互靠拢、相互融合的结论，融惩戒与豁免于一体的第三种司法责任制形式呼之欲出。

第四章在对中国惩戒型司法责任制进行理论反思和实践评估的基础上，认为中国现行的司法责任制是惩戒有余而对法官则是保障不够。这种高度的惩戒性已经影响了法官的思维和判断，脱离了设置之初衷，走向了其反面，成为实现司法公正的绊脚石。西方法治国家的豁免型司法责任制虽然能从最大程度上维护司法独立和法官中立，但这种严重弱化对审判权进行管理和监督制约功能的责任制形式不符合中国的国情，中国并无直接移植的政治意愿和制度需求，因而论证建立符合中国政治意愿和制度需求又符合司法规律的司法责任制形式--有限度的司法责任制--就成为本章也是本论文的重点。这一点正好与第三章的结论相呼应，有限度的司法责任制形式是能够在对审判权进行监督管理和维护法官独立行使审判权之间进行平衡的、融惩戒与豁免于一体的第三种司法责任制形式，这种司法责任制的限度表现在三个方面：具有法官责任豁免权内容、以程序责任为主体的法官责任追究模式和具有时效控制的司法责任制形式。

Wherever there is power, there is duty. It is dangerous to have power without responsibility. In this sense, responsibility is the guarantee of the operation of power. Compare to judicial power, judicial responsibility system can prevent abuse of power. Yet it also forms reverse stimulation as an external force on judges. Pressure from excessive responsibility will affects judges’ thinking and judgment. Independent thinking is the premise and basis for judges to exercise judicial power independently and core contents of judge independence and neutrality as the cornerstone of judicial justice. Obviously, excessive judicial responsibility will affect even undermine the cornerstone of judicial justice. Excessive means there is limitation of judicial responsibility. This thesis takes this as an argument and combines on-going judicial reform in China to demonstrate the limitation of Chinese judicial responsibility system. In addition to introduction and conclusion, this thesis is divided into four chapters.
Chapter one finds such a phenomenon in the history of the evolution process during the emergence and development of Chinese judicial responsibility system that it comes with judicial reform and is part of Chinese judicial reform. Chinese judicial responsibility system resulted in the endeavor of reducing administrative interference on judicial organs. In the background of judicial reform, Chinese judicial responsibility carries administration and supervision functions of judicial activities. Extension of management and supervision functions calls for accountability of trial result responsibility, comprehensive responsibility and lifetime accountability. It is these three characteristics show the punishment feature of Chinese judicial responsibility system and to certain extent manifest unlimited responsibility feature of judicial activities. This is what the author called as disciplinary mode of judicial responsibility system. In this chapter, the author focuses on the reasons of this disciplinary mode of Chinese judicial responsibility system and puts in- depth inquiry. One reason is tradition factor affected by Chinese ancient judicial system. The stress demand of modern judicial credit crisis of China is another important cause. But the most important one is path dependence of Chinese judicial administrative trial management system centered in judicial chief executive responsibility system.

Chapter two mainly compares judicial responsibility systems of extraterritorial countries, especially western countries under the rule of law. In fact, western countries do not have such judicial responsibility system in strict sense as China. They either contain so many disputes and arguments on this issue as we have in China. Judicial disciplinary system on the basis of judges’ immunities is the main body of western judicial accountability system. Hence it is immunity mode of judicial responsibility system. From the historical development of the immunity system, judge exemption experienced evolution from absolute immunity to relative immunity and includes both civil and criminal aspects. The exemption of judges’ responsibility in modern western countries under the rule of law generally includes these two aspects, only with different degrees. The purpose of the exemption of judges’ responsibility is to achieve judicial impartiality through judicial independence and neutrality of judges. It is the reason why the independence and neutrality of judges are the political cornerstones of immunity judicial responsibility system. Another content of judicial accountability in western countries is judicial punishment. In these countries, the appropriateness of judges’ conduct is the only measurement of punishment or not. This is not just the standard of behavior, but also the standard of ethics. It is an ethical standard to evaluate whether the judge’s behavior is proper. Yet it is not an absolute result standard nor indication of wrong cases. In other words, the object of judicial punishment is not the result of judgment but the behavior of judges. The judges can not and will not be punished because of the judgments they made are disputed or even be deemed as wrong. This is the soul of immunity mode of judicial responsibility system. In addition, to maintain judicial independence and neutrality, judicial immunity accountability system even sets up forbidden area that the judicial punishment body should excludes accusations directly on substantial issues of judgments including procedural verdicts. Pure judicial functions such as fact ascertainments and application of law should also be excluded as cases accepted by judicial punishment body. Apparently, the existence of judicial exemption and set-up of judicial punishment forbidden area indicate that there is limitation of judicial accountability system in western countries under the rule of law.

Chapter three starts from exploration of institutional environment of disciplinary mode and immunity mode of judicial responsibility systems. The author discovered that disciplinary mode of judicial responsibility system lives with bureaucracy justice realization system, and the immunity mode of judicial responsibility system is combined in neutral justice realization system. Based on comprehensive analysis of the intrinsic mechanism of bureaucratic justice realization system and neutral justice realization system, this thesis analyzed integration of motivations and trends of these two types and drew a conclusion that two corresponding judicial responsibility system inevitably will close to and integrated with each other. The third kind of judicial responsibility that combined disciplinary and immunity characteristics is about to come.

In the fourth chapter, on the basis of theoretical reflection and practical evaluation of current judicial responsibility system in China, it is considered more on punishment and lack of enough safeguards for judges. Such a high degree of discipline has affected judges’ thinking and judgment, disorientated from its original intention. Now the adverse effect has become the stumbling block to judicial justice. Although the western mode can effectively maintain judicial independence and neutrality of judges to the maximum extent, yet its weakness in judicial power management and supervision function does not comply with China’s national condition. China has no political will and institutional demand to directly transplant from other countries. Establishing limited judicial responsibility system complying with Chinese political will, institutional demand and judicial nature is the essence of this chapter and thesis. This argument echoes the conclusion of chapter three that limited judicial responsibility system is the third type of judicial accountability that balancing and integrating supervision of judicial power and maintain the independence of judges. This limit is demonstrated from three aspects: immunities of judges, procedural responsibilities only, and accountability with time limit.