制度變遷和中國法官行為選擇:從社會控制到價值共識

Research on the Institutional Change and Chinese Judge's Choice: From Social Control to Value Consensus

Student thesis: Doctoral Thesis

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Award date3 Feb 2023

Abstract

本研究是以制度分析方法分析中国法官个体行为选择的定位与评价,即法官行为在依法治国语境下的社会功能,意在探究法官行为选择和维护制度秩序稳定的关系,即依法治国需要依靠功能实用主义视角下的强制性控制还是全社会成员价值共识与合意下的自觉遵守。

尽管每一个国家的法官都需要在法律的不确定性和司法的合理性之间寻找司法裁决的权威和确定性,中国法官个体行为选择当下面临的合法性危机似乎更为复杂。到底是什么导致了法官生存环境的自我认同、社会认同降低以及司法裁决有效性的低位运行(司法裁决自动履行率),越办越多的案件以及各类社会评价和考核越来越多令法官们应接不暇,依靠法院、法官的努力是否足以解决和改变这一现实困境?这些和制度有关系吗?

从本质上看,当下中国法官行为选择的困境反映了法院组织作为公权力机构面临的合法性危机。作为政治结构组成的子系统,中国法院和法官行为选择面临自身本身需要自证行为合法性的现状,甚至这种需求客观上可以做到阻碍生效司法裁决的执行。从社会舆论的角度,这种危机产生常常被归因于法院组织结构、法官个人能力和制度环境的适应性视角,进而归责于法官个体行为选择,辅之产生了终身追责的司法责任制。在现行制度体制下,如何正确看待法官职业定位和法官行为?司法裁决的权威是靠法官努力工作获得的还是制度赋予的?法官的正确行为选择应该是通过事无巨细的强制性控制维护社会稳定和发展,还是推动形成社会价值共识维护制度秩序的动态稳定?现实迫切需要理论和实践层面对于这一问题进行深度观察与剖析。从这个意义上说,制度理论提供了分析制度环境和特殊职业个体行为选择互动的基础理论和实践分析方法。

确认行为选择和制度的关系之前必须明确制度定义。制度定义是最复杂的概念。制度研究的基础理论认为所有社会结果,包括制度变迁,都是人类行为和社会结构互动的产物。由个体行为选择集合形成的社会行动基于工具性因素和规范性因素与个体行为的互动。

广义的制度变迁理论是把行为体(人)、观念、利益冲突、权力冲突、社会运动、合理化/合法化以及人为选择统一进行整合的框架,这种整合通过人(行为体)和制度之间的双向互动推动社会发展变迁,有时候可能是倒退和崩溃。制度变迁过程中产生影响的关键因素,传统制度主义者强调利益冲突、权力过程、信息结构、价值、规范和社会承诺的重要性,组织分析的新制度主义则是强调文化和认知的过程惯例和图式、合法化过程和正式结构的重要性。

斯科特整合了先前不同研究领域对于制度分析的各种研究路向,把组织研究纳入制度分析理论,提出了一个理顺关于制约行动者的制度和个体能动者之间关系的制度分析模型。斯科特制度分析模型确定制度的要素包括规制性、规范性和文化—认知性要素三种,并且对三者基础假定、机制和运行信号的区别进行明确:在不同的社会系统中,这三种要素通过符号系统、关系系统、惯例和人工器物等载体与个体、集体行动者进行国家-民族、社会、“组织场域”、组织种群、个体组织和组织子系统六个层次的跨领域交叉互动,可以单独或者共同通过权力支持形塑个体行为模式,同时接受个体行动者的能动性反馈共同完成制度化过程,即社会结构化、集体利益实现与保护的过程。这是一个循环往复的制度建构、扩散、维持、创新、改革或剧变的制度变迁过程,期间,三大要素以相互支持和相互强化的方式构成一个强有力、有弹性的社会框架。在这个过程中,制度通过组织目的、组织结构、组织程序嵌入完成对人的行为的引导、模仿、制约,组织依靠个人行为选择的集体行动、“组织场域竞争”的合法性权威获得完成制度任务并创新制度。制度系统“形塑”行动者(包括个体行动者和子系统集体行动者)的行为选择的过程既是自上而下的制度传播、扩散过程,也是行动者行为选择自下而上能动反馈社会系统生活真实性和创新变革的过程,这个过程可以描述为通过制度化、结构化、组织化过程制约和赋能个体行为选择的过程。社会系统就在制度秩序的基础上演化和进化。公共机构要维护制度秩序的稳定,就会产生组织及其个体成员组织行为选择的权威性和合法性问题。

法官行为选择的困境说明审判权的合法性遭遇了挑战。权力合法性问题关注的是“解释社会秩序或对社会秩序是合理的证明,通过这种解释和证明是制度安排在主观上是合理的”问题,即通过把行动定位于“一种可理解的、有意义的世界”,而促使行动者实施行动的问题。合法性行为、合理性行为都是一个变量,而不是假定。合法性具有责任性、明确性、授权性的特点。 组织功能合法性来源于组织在上一级特定制度秩序中的合法性,组织合法性直接关系组织成员个体性行为选择的合法性。合法性行为和合理性、有效性、真实性密切相关。合理性行为具有很多种形式,工具合理性、价值合理性和道德合理性都可以单独通过权力的合法性宣示成为合法性行为。公共机构行为选择的合法性直接影响相关制度的有效性。而且,合法性和有效性常常会产生和社会生活中的真实性脱耦的现象。

法院作为国家审判权的行使机关,解决的是维护制度结构有效性的问题,合理性和真实性是裁判基础,不能挑战有效性。法院组织被赋予了强制性社会控制的工具性实用主义机构职能,可以称之为天职,这是一个恒定的定量,而法官能力素质及其社会环境相较于其社会控制的机构职能,则都是变量。任何一个社会存在都不会依靠单纯的社会控制或者价值共识,都是这两种社会秩序稳定方式此强彼弱的混合体。这种情况下还需要强调价值共识引导下制度的自我实施是因为,权力属性决定了强制性社会控制使用不当必然会产生暴政,一方面引发社会成员更加激烈的抗争,导致政治、经济、社会制度秩序的断裂和崩溃,另一方面会伴生巨大的社会执法成本,客观导致让守法人为违法者买单的负功能,进而阻碍社会的正常发展。强制性越强的制度,工具主义和实用主义的特征越明显,社会治理成本越高。因此,在社会面可控前提下,越是基于社会共识、价值共识的制度化、结构化社会越会持久持续持,诉讼量小而共识引导功能强大,对于社会秩序、社会结构稳定的维护就更有效。特别需要强调的是,这里提倡社会价值共识不是唯社会价值共识,即不能为了共识放弃政治经济秩序的稳定底线进行个体利益的迎合。这也是法治和法律作为集体行动的基本底线。微观上,在组织集体行动和个体行动选择的过程中,必须要面对短期利益和长远利益的博弈,所以出现短期制度的反复是正常的。帕累托最优做了这样一个假定,他在对于囚徒困境般的社会互动的合作做了大量分析之后,提出“在一次单独的互动中,主导性策略是不遵守规则,而规则得以自我实施并保持稳定,只有在遵守规则可以解决多次囚徒困境博弈的情形下才可能” 以解释制度的集体行动属性和普遍意义。失去制度的普遍性意义,大量依靠同类型案件一案一策的调解型、商谈型裁决寻求案结事了、息事宁人,必然会把问题引向另一个虚无的无政府主义极端自由,在市场资本需要不确定性创造利润的环境下,显然解决不了社会冲突的不确定性这个全人类的千古执政现实难题,按下葫芦浮起瓢,甚至造成对于制度权威、执政者身份认同的冲击。因此,在不确定性成为社会必然属性的情况下,要求法官行为选择发挥能动性彻底解决纠纷是不现实的。因为大量的非正式的规范性规则会与正式规则进行博弈,用民意测验与投票行为、信访数量的方式评估法官行为选择的合理性必然会制约其选择的主动性和积极性、正当性,失去代表国家集体行动行使审判权时实施法律规则并强加于他人之上的占优行动优势,屈从个体及其身边最接近群体的短期利益放弃制度长远利益,这对制度秩序的长期稳定进步目标必然是不利的。也必须看到,僵化的制度规则遵守同样会使制度框架和秩序失去弹性:失去对创新的包容与激励。

社会制度结构通过社会行动提供纠纷冲突解决方案。有了明确的制度结构,为了保证其正确实施,还需要一个“裁判员”。研究尝试探讨:1、法官职业的出现、法官行为选择和制度及其变迁之间是否具有相关性,如果有,是一种什么样的关系,强相关还是弱相关?2、法官行为选择是作为迎合短期地方民意的个体行动者行动还是代表国家集体强制权威的集体行动对于社会民主进步更为有效?二者之间是对立关系吗?3、从制度分析角度,如何看待中国法官面临结案数量上升、群众评价以及组织机制运行面临的内、外部非议?4、依法治国总要求下,中国法官如何能够致力于推进价值共识引导下的法律制度的自我实施?

研究兼顾理论的正确性和经验现象的复杂性。借助斯科特制度分析模型,研究通过分析得出四个结论。在制度变迁过程中,法官个体通过司法裁决一是维护制度秩序的结构化过程,与制度环境“协同进化”并维护制度结构;二是呼应社会系统对于冲突、纠纷解决的现实需求,依照制度内容和法律授权定分止争;三是通过行使审判权创造有利于维护社会系统制度秩序的价值共识并引导社会认知以及社会行动;四是规范自身职业行为提升其它社会行动者对于执政当局的合法性认知和忠诚。

回应社会效率、社会正义的制度功能工具性需求、为执政当局提供长期执政的意识形态法律化和社会价值观合法性宣示、提供普遍性奖惩信息稳定社会预期,应当是法院组织集体行动目标设置和法官行为选择的基本功能。为具体矛盾纠纷提供解决方案是路径不是目的是手段,诉讼数量暴增不但绝不是法治社会的标志或者法治的胜利,正相反,是法院组织外部政治、经济力量对比过程中社会治理存在问题和社会离心力的反映,也是法官压力之源。同样,以规则规范的生产量(法制)取代法治、以迎合少数利益的个体行动取代法官行为选择的强制性社会集体行动、放弃承认权力的非对称性都是短期的策略性竞争行为,冲击制度权威。没有裁判之前的事件评估机制,就没有对法官行为选择的绩效评价客观性。明确裁判权授权、属性、归属及与之匹配的责任机制,让有决策权的法官愿意裁判、敢于裁判才可能真正实现法院的制度目标。无条件遵守法院的生效裁决和畅通法律程序之内的救济渠道,是法治社会建设的必要条件。法官职业能力和操守只是保证司法裁决强制执行力的可改进变量。

诉讼和审判的社会功能并不像我们看到的那么显性,是一个反映社会系统及其子系统复杂结构多层运行状态防范系统性危机的晴雨表。忽视诉讼的社会属性和审判的权力性质,势必进入一个虚无的权利认知误区。认真对待诉讼,是法治社会的基础和前提,也是对人类历史制度和未来命运的敬畏与尊重。
This study uses the method of institutional analysis to analyze the positioning and evaluation of Chinese judges' individual behavior choice, that is, the social function of judges' behavior in the context of governing the country according to law, in order to explore the relationship between judges' behavior choice and maintaining the stability of institutional order. The rule of law needs to rely on the mandatory control from the perspective of functional pragmatism or the conscious compliance under the value consensus and agreement of the members of the whole society.

Although judges in every country need to find the authority and certainty of judicial decisions between the uncertainty of law and the rationality of justice, the legitimacy crisis faced by Chinese judges' individual behavior choice seems to be more complex. What in the end leads to the self-identity of judges' living environment, the reduction of social identity and the low operation of the effectiveness of judicial decisions (the automatic performance rate of judicial decisions), more and more cases, the expansion of internal institutions from the expansion to the reform of large department system, and more and more social evaluation and assessment. Is it enough to rely on the efforts of courts and judges to solve and change this practical dilemma? Do these have anything to do with the system?

At present, the dilemma of judge's behavior choice in China reflects the legitimacy crisis faced by the court organization as a public authority. As a subsystem composed of political structure, the behavior choice of courts and judges is faced with the current situation that they need to prove the legitimacy of their own behavior, and even this demand can objectively hinder the implementation of effective judicial decisions. From the perspective of public opinion, this crisis is often attributed to the adaptive perspective of court organizational structure, judges' personal ability and institutional environment, and then attributed to the judges' individual behavior choice, which is supplemented by the judicial responsibility system of lifelong accountability. Under the current system, how to treat the judge's profession and behavior correctly? Is the authority of judicial decisions obtained by the hard work of judges or given by the system? Is the judge's correct behavior choice to maintain social stability and development through meticulous mandatory control, or to promote the formation of social value consensus and maintain the dynamic stability of institutional order? There is an urgent need for in-depth observation and analysis of this problem at the theoretical and practical levels. In this sense, institutional theory provides a basic theoretical and practical analysis method to analyze the interaction between institutional environment and individual behavior choice of special occupation.

Institutional definition is the most complex concept. The basic theory of institutional research holds that all social outcomes are the product of human behavior and social structure, and social action includes the interaction of instrumental factors and normative factors. The theory of institutional change in a broad sense is a framework that integrates actors (people), ideas, conflicts of interest, power conflicts, social movements, rationalization / legalization and artificial choice. This integration promotes social development and change through the two-way interaction between people (actors) and institutions, which may sometimes be retrogression and collapse. Traditional institutionalists emphasize the importance of conflict of interest, power process, information structure, value, norm and social commitment, while the new institutionalism of organizational analysis emphasizes the importance of cultural and cognitive process, convention and schema, legalization process and formal structure.

Scott integrated various research directions of previous institutional analysis, incorporated organizational research into institutional analysis theory, and put forward an institutional analysis model to straighten out the relationship between the system restricting actors and individual agents. Scott's institutional analysis model determines that the elements of the system include regulatory, normative and cultural cognitive elements, and defines the differences between the three basic assumptions, mechanisms and operation signals. In different social systems, these three elements interact with individual and collective actors at six levels of state nation, society, organization field, organization population, individual organization and organization subsystem through symbol system, relationship system, convention and artifact, and can shape individual behavior patterns alone or jointly through power support, At the same time, we accept the initiative feedback of individual actors and jointly complete the process of institutionalization, that is, the process of social structure, the realization and protection of collective interests. This is a cycle of institutional change process of institutional construction, diffusion, maintenance, innovation, reform or drastic change. During this period, the three elements form a strong and flexible social framework in a way of mutual support and mutual reinforcement. In this process, the system completes the guidance, imitation and restriction of human behavior through the embedding of organizational purpose, organizational structure and organizational procedures. The organization relies on the collective action of individual behavior choice and the legitimacy authority of organizational field competition to complete the institutional task and innovate the system. The behavior choice of institutional system shaping actors (including individual actors and subsystem collective actors) is not only a top-down process of institutional communication and diffusion, but also a process of actors' behavior choice actively feeding back the authenticity of social system life and innovation and change from bottom to top, that is, restricting and enabling individual behavior choice through institutionalization, structure and organization. The social system evolves and evolves on the basis of institutional order. When public institutions maintain the stability of institutional order, the authority and legitimacy of the behavior choice of organizations and their individual members will arise.

The dilemma of judge's behavior choice shows that the legitimacy of judicial power has been challenged. The issue of power legitimacy focuses on the issue of "explaining or proving that the social order is reasonable, and the institutional arrangement is subjectively reasonable through this interpretation and proof", that is, the issue of promoting actors to implement actions by positioning actions in "an understandable and meaningful world". Legitimacy behavior and rationality behavior are variables, not assumptions. Legitimacy has the characteristics of responsibility, clarity and authorization. The legitimacy of organizational function comes from the legitimacy of the organization in the specific institutional order at the upper level. Organizational legitimacy is directly related to the legitimacy of individual sexual behavior choices of organizational members. Legitimate behavior is closely related to rationality, effectiveness and authenticity. Rational behavior has many forms. Instrumental rationality, value rationality and moral rationality can become legitimate behavior through the declaration of the legitimacy of power. The legitimacy of the behavior choice of public institutions directly affects the effectiveness of relevant systems. Moreover, legitimacy and effectiveness are often decoupled from authenticity in social life.

As the exercise organ of the national judicial power, the court solves the problem of maintaining the effectiveness of the institutional structure. Rationality and authenticity are the basis of judgment and cannot challenge the effectiveness. The court organization is endowed with the instrumental pragmatic institutional function of mandatory social control, which can be called the vocation, which is a constant quantitative, while the ability and quality of judges and their social environment are variables compared with the institutional function of social control. In this case, we also need the self-implementation of the system under the guidance of value consensus, because the attribute of power determines that the improper use of compulsory social control will inevitably lead to tyranny. On the one hand, it will lead to more fierce resistance among social members, leading to the rupture and collapse of political, economic and social system order, on the other hand, it will be accompanied by huge social law enforcement costs, the objective emergence of the negative function of allowing the legal person to pay for the violators, which hinders the normal development of society. The stronger the mandatory system, the more obvious the characteristics of instrumentalism and pragmatism, and the higher the cost of social governance. Therefore, under the premise of controllable social aspects, the more institutionalized and structured society based on social consensus and value consensus will last for a long time, with small litigation volume and powerful guiding function, which is more effective for the maintenance of social order and social structure stability. In particular, it needs to be emphasized that the promotion of social value consensus here is not only social value consensus, that is, we cannot abandon the bottom line of political and economic order for consensus and cater to individual interests. This is also the basic bottom line of the rule of law and law as collective action. At the micro level, in the process of organizing collective action and individual action choice, we must face the game between short-term interests and long-term interests, so it is normal to have the repetition of short-term system. Pareto optimality makes the assumption that after a lot of analysis on the cooperation of prisoner's dilemma like social interaction, It is proposed that "in a single interaction, the dominant strategy is not to abide by the rules, and the rules can be self implemented and maintained stable. It is only possible when abiding by the rules can solve the game of prisoner's dilemma for many times" to explain the collective action attribute and universal significance of the system. Losing the universal significance of the system and relying heavily on the mediation and negotiation decisions of one case and one policy in the same type of cases to seek the settlement of the case and pacify the people will inevitably lead the problem to another nihilistic extreme freedom. Under the environment of uncertain market capital needs and profit creation, Obviously, it can not solve the uncertainty of social conflict, which is the eternal ruling practical problem of all mankind. Pressing the gourd floats the ladle, and even causes an impact on the institutional authority and the identity of the ruler. Therefore, when uncertainty has become an inevitable attribute of society, it is unrealistic to require judges to give full play to their initiative and completely solve disputes. Because a large number of informal normative rules will play games with formal rules, evaluating the rationality of judges' behavior choice by means of public opinion polls, voting behavior and the number of letters and visits will inevitably restrict their initiative, enthusiasm and legitimacy, and lose the dominant action advantage of implementing legal rules and imposing them on others when exercising judicial power on behalf of the national collective. Succumbing to the short-term interests of individuals and their closest groups and abandoning the long-term interests of the system is bound to be unfavorable to the long-term stability and progress goal of the system order. At the same time, rigid compliance with institutional rules will also make the institutional framework and order lose flexibility: lose the tolerance and incentive for innovation.

The social institutional structure provides solutions through social action. With a clear institutional structure, to ensure its correct implementation, we also need a "referee". The research attempts to explore: 1. Is there a correlation between the emergence of the judge profession, the judge's behavior choice and the system and its changes? If so, what kind of relationship is it, strong correlation, or weak correlation? 2. Is the judge's behavior choice as an individual actor close to the people or a collective action representing the collective coercive authority of the state more effective for the progress of social democracy? Is there an antagonistic relationship between the two? 3. From the perspective of institutional analysis, how to treat the internal and external criticism faced by Chinese judges in the rising number of closed cases, mass evaluation and the operation of organizational mechanism? 4. Under the general requirement of governing the country according to law, how can Chinese judges devote themselves to promoting the self-implementation of the legal system under the guidance of value consensus?

The research gives consideration to the correctness of theory and the complexity of empirical phenomena. With the help of Scott's institutional analysis model, the study draws four conclusions through analysis. In the process of institutional change, individual judges pass judicial decisions. First, they maintain the structural process of institutional order and coevolve with the institutional environment and maintain the institutional structure; Second, respond to the practical needs of the social system for conflict and dispute resolution, and stop disputes according to the content of the system and legal authorization; Third, through the exercise of judicial power, create a value consensus conducive to maintaining the institutional order of the social system and guide social cognition and social action; Fourth, standardize their own professional behavior and improve the legitimacy cognition and loyalty of other social actors to the ruling authority.

Responding to the instrumental needs of the institutional function of social efficiency and social justice, providing the ruling authorities with the declaration of the legitimacy of long-term ruling legal ideology and social values, providing universal reward and punishment information, and stabilizing social expectations should be the basic functions of the goal setting of collective action of the court organization and the behavior choice of judges. Providing solutions to specific contradictions and disputes is the path rather than the purpose. The sharp increase in the number of lawsuits is not only the symbol of a society ruled by law or the victory of the rule of law, but also the reflection of social governance problems and social centrifugal force in the process of the comparison of external political and economic forces of the court organization. It is also the source of pressure on judges. Similarly, replacing the rule of law with rule-based production (legal system), replacing the mandatory social collective action of judge's behavior choice with people-friendly individual action, and giving up the asymmetry of recognition of power are short-term strategic competitive behaviors that impact the institutional authority. If the judge's behavior choice does not provide the event evaluation mechanism before the judgment, there will be no objectivity of the judge's performance evaluation. Only by clarifying the authorization of jurisdiction, the attribute, attribution, and matching responsibility mechanism of jurisdiction, and making the judges with decision-making power willing to judge and dare to judge, can the system goal of the court be truly realized. Unconditional compliance with the effective ruling of the court is a necessary condition for the construction of a society ruled by law. The professional ability and ethics of judges are only improvable variables to ensure the enforcement of judicial decisions.

The social function of litigation and trial is not as explicit as we see. It is a barometer reflecting the multi-layer operation state of the complex structure of social system and its subsystems. Ignoring the social attribute of litigation and the power nature of trial is bound to enter a false cognitive misunderstanding of rights. Taking litigation seriously is not only the basis and premise of a society ruled by law, but also the awe and respect for human historical system and future destiny.

    Research areas

  • institutional change, Judge's choice of behavior, Compulsory guarantee, Self implementation, Legitimacy loyalty