The Impact of Controlling Shareholders’ Stock Pledge on Corporate Transparency, Cash Dividends and Expropriations: Evidence from China


Student thesis: Doctoral Thesis

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  • Ni LI

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Awarding Institution
Award date4 May 2015


This dissertation examines the impact of controlling shareholders‘ stock pledge on corporate transparency, cash dividends and expropriations using the Chinese sample. Stock pledge means shareholders use stock of listed firms they hold as the pledged assets to apply for loans. I hypothesize that controlling shareholders‘ stock pledge in NSOEs increase the demand of creditors to get more information on the quality of stock and this demand improves the corporate transparency of listed firms in the first paper of this dissertation. I also conjecture that such relation is insignificant in SOEs. Using the empirical framework of difference in difference approach, I find support for these conjectures. In the second paper of this dissertation, I examine the association among controlling shareholders‘ stock pledge, cash dividends and expropriations using the sample of NSOEs. Consistent with the monitoring role of creditors, controlling shareholders‘ stock pledge does not influence cash dividends and expropriations significantly.