Under the environment of market economy, demand-based pricing strategy is an inevitable choice for firms. However, due to indirect sale to consumers, upstream suppliers only can learn market demand information from retailers. With the rapid development of e-commerce, online consumer reviews break the original situation where suppliers’ pricing could only rely on the ordering information provided by retailers, and make it possible for suppliers to know consumers’ purchase willingness and market demand information directly, which however leads to a more complicated pricing process. Existing literatures only consider the impact of consumer reviews on suppliers’ pricing under a single period model which can’t provide theoretical supports for suppliers’ pricing in reality. In addition, existing literatures only focus on the pricing problems in single scenario which can’t provide optimal pricing decisions for suppliers in more complex situations. Therefore, this dissertation studies the effect of consumer reviews on supplier’s optimal pricing decisions by constructing two-stage dynamic game theory model under three operating scenarios.

Specifically, according to the direct or indirect sale methods of supplier, this dissertation focuses on three operating scenarios: direct channel, retail channel and mixed channel. Then, considering consumers’ delay purchase behavior, retailer’s strategic inventory level and fairness concerns between channels as the most important influencing factors on original demand information in three operating scenarios respectively, the dissertation analyzes the supplier’s optimal pricing decisions with consumer reviews which is regarded as new demand information source. The dissertation provides theoretical supports for the optimal pricing decisions of suppliers under three operating scenarios, and finds the role of consumer reviews on solving the problems of unsalable products in direct channel and the restricted bargaining power in retail channel, also the problem of channel conflicts in mixed channel.

Specifically, the research content and innovation conclusions we obtained in this dissertation are explained from the following aspects:

1. Firstly, this study analyzes supplier’s behavior-based pricing discrimination in a direct channel with consumer reviews and strategic consumers’ delay purchase. The delay purchase of consumers always hurts firms’ profits and makes them unable to achieve optimal when applying behavior-based pricing discrimination. Existing research only focuses on consumers’ perception of pricing discrimination behavior (e.g.: Li, Li, and Wang (2020), etc.), but ignores consumers’ purchase willingness. Due to the problem of supplier’s unsalable products, we consider that consumers’ decisions of buying are influenced by reviews. Then, we study supplier’s two-stage optimal behavior-based pricing discrimination in a direct channel by constructing a demand model which is affected by consumer reviews and delay purchase behavior. We find that: 1) Consumer reviews can strengthen positive impact of behavior-based pricing discrimination and improve supplier’s profit when consumers rely on reviews and the product quality is high. 2) When the product quality is improved, the supplier should set lower introduction price which can reduce the delay purchase of consumers and lead to pleasant consumer reviews in the later period. 3) With the influence of consumer reviews, product quality becomes an important factor for supplier’s decisions on behavior-based pricing discrimination, where the supplier will attract new consumers when the product quality is in a high level, and reward past consumers when the product quality is poor. 4) When considering consumer reviews, supplier will set a penetration pricing policy when the product quality is good, and adopt a skimming pricing strategy when the product quality is poor. This study clarifies the role of consumer reviews on the problem of unsalable products, and expands the relevant theory of firm’s behavior-based pricing discrimination, and also provides theoretical support for supplier’s optimal pricing decisions when adopting a direct channel.

2. Secondly, this study analyzes supplier’s dynamic pricing decisions in a retail channel with consumer reviews and retailer’s strategic inventory. As retailer’s inventory always restricts the bargaining power of supplier in retail channel, the existing literatures have studied the role of consumer rebate information and gift card promotion information on supplier’s bargaining power (e.g.: Arya and Mittendorf (2013)，Li, Pan, and Tang (2016), etc.), but they all ignore the impact of consumer demand information on supplier. Due to the problem of supplier’s restricted bargaining power, we consider that consumer reviews can provide the demand information directly for supplier. Then, we study supplier’s two-stage optimal dynamic pricing decisions in a retail channel by constructing a demand model which is affected by consumer reviews and retailer’s strategic inventory level. We find that: 1) When product quality is improved, supplier can charge a higher second-period wholesale price by the pleasant online reviews, and increase the bargaining power even with higher strategic inventory. 2) Besides the inventory holding costs, the other two important factors should be considered when making optimal decisions of strategic inventory, which includes the consumers’ review reliance and the product quality. 3) With consumer reviews, when the retailer has the ability to carry strategic inventory, the supplier should charge a higher introduction wholesale price to weaken the retailer’s purchasing power. 4) With good product quality, the supplier should set lower introduction wholesale price to strengthen the positive effect of consumer reviews. This study clarifies the role of consumer reviews on the problem of supplier’s restricted bargaining power, and enriches the relevant theories of strategic inventory, and also provides theoretical support for supplier’s optimal pricing decisions when adopting a retail channel.

3. Finally, this study analyzes supplier’s channel pricing decisions in a mixed channel with consumer reviews and peer-induced fairness concerns. Firms which adopt mixed channel often meet intensified channel conflicts due to fairness concerns. The existing research only focuses on the effect of consumer value-added service level on fairness concerns (e.g.: Yang, Zheng, Wu, and et al. (2019), etc.), but ignores the impact of channel consumers’ perceived product quality differences. Due to the problem of supplier’s channel conflicts, we consider that consumer reviews can reduce the consumers’ perceived product quality between channels. Then, we study supplier’s two-stage optimal dual channel pricing decisions in a mixed channel by constructing a demand model affected by consumer reviews and fairness concerns. We find that: 1) When consumers rely more on reviews, the dual-channel price disparity will be shrunken in the second period, which alleviates the negative effect caused by the fairness concerns. 2) Consumer reviews can alleviate the double marginalization effect and improve the supply chain coordination when the product quality is in a high level. 3) When consumers’ review reliance is low, supplier will increase the online introduction selling price to offset the negative impact of consumers’ fairness concerns. 4) As consumer reviews can transmit the information from previous buyers, it can increase the supplier’s profit by improving consumers’ expected product quality in the later period when the quality is good. This study clarifies the role of consumer reviews on alleviating the fairness concerns and channel conflicts, and expands the relevant theory that consumer reviews can improve the supply chain coordination, and also provides theoretical support for supplier’s optimal pricing decisions when adopting a mixed channel.