董事會秘書背景對中國民營企業IPO抑價的影響之實證分析

The Empirical Analysis of Influence of Board Secretary on IPO Underpricing - Evidence from Chinese Non-State Owned Firms

Student thesis: Doctoral Thesis

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Author(s)

  • Jiarong HUA

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Award date24 Jun 2015

Abstract

新股發行是企業從資本市場上獲取發展所需資金的重要途徑,在企業的發展進程中發揮重要作用,特別對於民營企業,他們難以獲取銀行貸款支持,更依賴於從資本市場融資。而新股發行抑價是發行方、承銷商、投資者三者在資訊不對稱的情況下對於發行定價的博弈結果,對於發行方來說是一種間接的發行成本。以往文獻對新股發行抑價進行了深入的研究,基於新股發行抑價的資訊不對稱理論,本文研究了董事會秘書的個人特徵以及職權背景是否影響其在新股發行中的角色發揮,即通過降低發行人與承銷商、投資人之間的資訊不對稱,降低IPO抑價。
2006年《公司法》確認了董事會秘書在資訊披露中的角色,之後也有一些學者從資訊披露品質的角度對董事會秘書的角色進行了研究和分析,但是仍沒有董事會秘書背景對IPO抑價影響的研究。本文從董事會秘書是否為職業董事會秘書、是否持股、是否兼任CFO、是否為董事會成員等背景出發,研究上述背景對IPO抑價的影響,提供了在新股發行股權結構進行重新設計時,董事會秘書背景通過影響資訊不對稱從而影響新股抑價的證據。
本文以中國2006-2012年A股民營上市公司為樣本研究,研究發現:(1)當董事會秘書具有職業董事會秘書背景時,有職業董事會秘書的公司並不能顯著的降低所在公司的IPO抑價,但是方向符合預期,只是不具有統計意義上的顯著性;(2)當董事會秘書持有公司股份時,可以顯著地降低IPO抑價;(3)董事會秘書兼任CFO也可以顯著降低公司的IPO抑價率;(4)董事會秘書兼任董事會成員可以顯著地降低公司的IPO抑價率;(5)董事會秘書年齡、是否為女性以及進入公司年限等特徵作用不明顯。
與以往基於公司所有權性質、定價機制設計、配售機制設計等角度研究新股發行抑價的文獻相比,本文的發現補充了新股發行抑價的資訊不對稱理論,通過降低發行過程中的資訊不對稱理論,可以降低發行抑價率。我們同時也提供了管理層個人特徵對公司行為影響的新證據,豐富了“高管梯隊理論”,同時有助於企業,特別是民營企業在擬IPO前期選擇董事會秘書時作為決策參考。在研究設計上,本文採用直接新股發行上市的民營企業,排除借殼上市的民營企業,與代理理論、信號理論的市場化企業的前提更一致。並且民營公司已經成為我國新股上市公司的最大來源,針對這一樣本的研究與分析,對於理解職業董事會秘書的定位、以及職業董事會秘書對民營企業IPO估值的影響等實際問題,對推動中國上市公司和資本市場的發展與創新有積極的意義。
Initial Public Offerings (IPO) is one of the most important process where firms receive external capital, especially for the non-state owned firms who are confronted with discrimination from banking systems. Thus, IPO underpricing is the consequence of games played by issuers, underwriters and investors, and also an indirect cost born by the issuers. Prior literature has provided abundant evidence about the IPO underpricing phenomena and its explanations, among which the information asymmetry theory is the most developed one. Based on the information asymmetry theory, we examine whether the board secretaries’ characteristics influence their functions during the IPO process through better communications and lowering the information asymmetries between related parties in the game.
There are some literatures about the board secretaries’ roles in information disclosures since Corporate Law confirmed their legal rights and obligations of information disclosures in 2006. However, neither is under the IPO setting where information asymmetries have great impact. We provide evidence that board secretaries’ characteristics, like their past experience, their stock holdings, or whether they have CFO and board occupations at the same time, indicate their capabilities and incentives to disclose information related to IPO.
With the non-state owned firms listed during 2006-2012 as sample, we find that board secretaries with past IPO experience do decrease the IPO underpricing, but the effect is rather humble. However, those firms with board secretaries holding stock shares or holding the CFO or board member positions at the same time experience significantly lower underpricing. While other personal characteristics like the gender or age have no effect on the board secretaries’ capabilities or incentives to influence IPO process.
Our findings may enrich the IPO underpricing literatures with information asymmetry explanations that certain person within the firm could decrease information asymmetry by better disclosures and thorough communications. Those results would also provide further support for the “Upper Echelons Theory” where top management team’s characteristics may influence firms’ behaviors. To implement our results in reality, non-state owned firms could choose board secretaries based on their past experience and background and grant them more stock holdings as well as more rights matching their obligations.