作為一種旨在解決所有權與管理權分離產生的代理問題的長期激勵機制，近年來我國越來越多上市公司開始推行股權激勵計畫。尤其是隨著民營經濟在國民經濟中的影響日益加大，民營上市公司逐漸成為股權激勵計畫的主力軍。截止2015年10月1日，我國A股市場2780家上市公司中，有1533家上市公司為民營上市公司；且根據本研究統計，2010年1月1日至2015年5月31日止共有406家民營上市公司首次推出股權激勵計畫，占全部民營上市公司的四分之一。一個值得關注的現象是，在民營上市公司的股權激勵計畫實例中有不少公司將實際控制人及其親屬作為被激勵物件直接參與股權激勵計畫。那麼，當實際控制人及其親屬直接參與或不參與股權激勵，對該股權激勵計畫的實施效果有何不同影響？這兩類股權激勵計畫的實際效果和利弊如何？為了回答這些問題，本論文在以往有關股權激勵和終極控制權研究的基礎上，從實際控制人的角度就民營企業股權激勵計畫的效果，包括市場反應和績效效應進行實證分析；並進一步就目前民營企業股權激勵實踐的現狀及面對的挑戰進行了梳理和總結。
本論文的實證研究選取了2010年1月1日至2015年5月31日期間首次公佈股權激勵草案的406家民營上市公司作為研究樣本，基於實際控制人的視角，從市場反應與公司績效兩個方面實證檢驗股權激勵的效果。研究結果顯示，從市場反應來看，實施股權激勵的民營上市公司的投資者能夠從股票市場獲得超常收益；且實際控制人及其親屬不作為股權激勵物件的民營上市公司的市場反應好於實際控制人及其親屬作為股權激勵物件的市場反應。這一結果說明，市場歡迎上市公司採取股權激勵計畫，但是並不完全認同民營上市公司實際控制人參與股權激勵計畫這一舉措。
其次，從股權激勵實施後民營上市公司財務績效和市場價值來看，首先，股權激勵方案中的受眾面越廣、激勵股權比重越高、行權條件越嚴格，股權激勵計畫越能有效激勵管理層及相關員工更加努力的工作，從而提高上市公司財務績效與市場價值；但是，本實證研究並未發現採用股票期權的股權激勵計畫相較於限制性股票能更有效改善公司財務績效和市場價值。其次，實際控制人及其親屬參與股權激勵不利好股權激勵對民營上市公司財務績效的改善和市場價值的提高。此結果再次驗證了實際控制人及其親屬作為股權激勵物件會給股權激勵計畫造成負面影響。
最後，根據本研究關於民營上市公司實際控制人是否參與股權激勵計畫的市場反應和公司績效影響的實證研究結果，本論文就民營企業改善股權激勵實施效果提出了方向性建議，包括：（1）對於監管層，完善股權激勵制度，規範實際控制人在股權激勵計畫中的角色，提高市場對實際控制人行為的監督能力；（2）對於上市公司，應制定受眾面廣、激勵股份占比高、行權指標嚴格的股權激勵計畫，且實際控制人應避免直接成為股權激勵物件。

As a long-term incentive mechanism for solving the agency issue arising from the separation of the company ownership and its management, share incentive schemes have been adopted by a growing number of listed mainland companies in recent years. By 1st October 2015, 1533 out of the 2780 companies listed in the A-share market in China were private enterprises. According to the data collected in this study, 406 listed private companies have introduced share incentive schemes, representing a quarter of the total number of listed private companies. However, it is found that in quite a few cases, the actual controllers of the companies have also participated in the share incentive plans offered by the companies. Then there arise some natural questions. For example, what effects does the direct participation of actual controllers have on the performance outcome of these share incentive schemes? What are the advantages and disadvantages of the stock incentive schemes with and without participation of the actual controllers of the companies? Based on previous research on share incentive schemes and ultimate control right, this thesis attempts to address these and other related questions by analyzing the market effects of the stock incentive plans, including market reaction and company performance, from the perspective of actual controllers. As part of the study, we also review the current status and issues in the practices of stock incentive plans by mainland listed private companies.
Taking the samples of 406 listed private companies with the first announcement of their share incentive scheme proposals between 1st January 2010 and 31st May 2015, this thesis explores the effects of share incentive schemes in market reaction and company performance from the perspective of actual controllers of listed private companies. It is observed that investors of the listed private companies with share incentive schemes would gain, on average, superior rates of return in the market. However, the market reaction to the share incentive schemes without participation of actual controllers outperforms those that involve the actual controllers or their immediate family members. The findings show that although the adoption of stock incentive schemes is generally favored by the market, the participation of actual controllers in these share incentive schemes is not well accepted by the market.
By looking into the listed private company's financial performance and market value after the implementation of the share incentive scheme, it is found that both the management and employees would be more motivated to work hard when a greater number of key staffs are covered by the share incentive scheme, a higher proportion of the company shares is allocated to the incentive scheme, and more stringent conditions are imposed on exercising share options. However, no evidence is found to support that share incentive schemes featuring stock options are more effective than restricted stock at improving companies' performance and market value. Moreover, the participation of the actual controllers and their immediate family members in the share incentive scheme does not lead to improvements in the companies' financial performance and market value. This again demonstrates that the direct participation of actual controllers could have negative effects on the share incentive schemes.
Finally, based on the findings of this study on the market reaction to the share incentive schemes with and without participation of the actual controllers, as well as on the company's performance in both scenarios, the following reccomdations are suggested: (1) The regulatory authority should look to improving the share incentive system, regulating the role of the actual controllers in the share incentive scheme and enhancing the capacity to monitor behaviors of the actual controllers; (2) the listed companies should adopt share incentive schemes that feature a greater coverage of key staffs, a higher proportion of the allocated company shares and more stringent conditions for exercising options, and also avoid the actual controllers of the companies to participate in their share incentive schemes.