中國審判權的官僚化︰ 審判分離是如何產生的?

The Bureaucratization of Adjudication Power in China: How do the Separations of Trial and Judgment Come into Being?

Student thesis: Doctoral Thesis

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Award date16 Aug 2017

Abstract

司法權力運行機制改革是中國共產黨十八大後由中共中央主導和推動的新一輪司法體制改革的核心內容之一,是一種強制性的制度變遷。祛除審判權運行中的“審判分離”現象,實現“讓審理者裁判,由裁判者負責”是此項改革的主要目標之一。然而,審判分離的原因和具體生成機制非常複雜,論文嘗試在中國審判權官僚化與審判分離生成機制之間建立起一種邏輯聯繫。通過分析中國司法的官僚制總體屬性及其異于其他官僚體制司法類型國家(地區)之獨特性(官僚制的強化和異化現象),論述其滲入審判權及其運行的過程以及所導致的審判權官僚化嬗變現狀。然後從官僚制的三個維度——組織結構、權力運行和管理模式切入,運用官僚制等相關理論並結合中國司法的具體實踐,對審判權官僚化導致的審判權運行之“審判分離”效應及其具體機理進行比較詳細闡述和深入論證,揭示出審判權官僚化乃決定審判權運行樣態的深層結構性要素之結論,從而為審判分離的生成機制提供一個令人信服的解釋性理論框架。此外,論文還以此結論回溯和觀照當前正在推進的審判權運行改革實踐,並指出存在的問題和提出方向性建議。

論文討論的問題主要包括中國審判權的官僚化以及由此導致的後果——審判分離效應兩個層面。除導論和結語兩部分外,論文主體部分共五章,以“現狀”和“後果”為邏輯分為上下兩編。

導論部分明確了審判權官僚化視野下的審判分離生成機制為論文研究的主旨,並闡述了研究的緣起、背景及意義、文獻梳理與綜述,主要研究方法及論文框架,以及可能的創新和不足。

上編:中國審判權的官僚化。以兩章篇幅闡述了中國審判權官僚化的嬗變過程及具體表徵。上編在邏輯上分為三大部分:第一部分從官僚制基本理論切入,分析歸納中國司法的官僚制總體屬性,以及其相異于韋伯理性官僚制的獨特性——強化和異化現象。在闡述達瑪什卡司法類型學理論基礎上,將中國司法納入其官僚制科層式司法類型的觀察視野。此外,還對審判權運行的結構要素、審判分離的具體涵義和類型化作了分析闡述。第二部分從審判權運行的結構要素切入,結合官僚制相關理論從審判主體格局、審判權力配置、審判運行程式、審判管理方式和審判決策技術五個維度論述審判權官僚化嬗變的五個特徵——審判主體格局的差序化、審判權力配置的級差化、審判運行程式的層級化、審判管理方式的控制化和審判決策技術的特定化等。第三部分通過比較分析,闡述和解釋了同為官僚制科層式司法類型的其他國家(地區),其審判權沒有落入官僚化運行軌道並出現審判分離現象的主要原因。

下編:審判分離是如何產生的?該部分用三章篇幅大致從官僚制的三個維度,結合官僚制相關理論論證審判權官僚化對審判權運行所產生的審判分離效應及其具體機理。首先是官僚制組織結構維度。即審判權官僚化下,審判主體的差序格局和審判權力的級差化配置,以及中國官僚體制的單位化治理特有的“組織性依附”文化對中國法院合議庭和審委會兩大典型法定審判組織的平權決策結構進行解構重塑,決策結構的官僚制科層異化導致了審判分離。其次是官僚制權力運行維度。通過以韋伯理想類型方法建構的審判權多重層級流轉模型,多角度地詳細論證了審判權層級流轉(層層審批)下,審與判多重形式分離和多重實質分離產生的必然性及其具體機理。再次是官僚制管理方式維度。聚焦于官僚化審判管理控制對審判權運行施加的影響,以法經濟學和博弈論為主要的分析工具,闡述了激勵性管理控制——審判績效考核和懲罰性管理控制——錯案責任追究所導致的審判分離效應及其生成機理。

結語部分簡要歸納和重申論文的研究結論:中國司法的官僚制及其獨特性因素導致了中國審判權的官僚化,並成為影響或決定審判權運行過程中審判分離生成的深層結構要素。最後以審判權官僚化因素為參照,對當前正在推進的審判權運行改革的制度文本和具體實踐進行對照檢視,指出審判權官僚化因素的不祛除甚至反向強化,將促使當前審判權改革實踐陷入一種“兩不是”的運行狀態。因而,審判權官僚化以及導致審判權官僚化的一些體制性因素的變革應成為審判權運行機制改革的重要著力點之一。
The reform of adjudication power exercise mechanism is one of the most crucial part of the reform of judicial system in progress led and promoted by the CPC Central Committee after the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China. The primary purpose of such reform is to remove the separation of trial and judgment from the operation process of adjudication power, attempting to let the judges adjudicate and let the adjudicators be accountable. However, the cause and the specific mechanism of the separation of trial and judgment are quite complicated. This thesis tries to establish a logical connection between the bureaucratization of adjudication power and the forming mechanism of the separation of trial and judgment. By analyzing the general nature and the uniqueness (the phenomenon of reinforcement and alienation) of the bureaucracy in China’s judicial system, this thesis also discusses their effects on adjudication power and its operation process, which lead to the bureaucratic evolution of adjudication power. And then a detailed formulation and in-depth demonstration will be focused on the separation of the trial and judgment caused by the bureaucratization of adjudication power, by means of relevant theory of bureaucracy and based on the Chinese judicial practice, from the perspective of three dimensions, namely organization structure, operation of power and management mode. Such formulation and demonstration will reveal the conclusion that the bureaucratization of adjudication power is the fundamental factor for determining the operation pattern of adjudication power, which provides a convincing explanatory theoretical frame for the forming mechanism of the separation of trial and judgment. Besides, this thesis will also review and reflect on the ongoing reform of adjudication power exercise mechanism, trying to point out the problems in existence and give some directional suggestions.

The problems discussed in this thesis mainly include two aspects, namely the bureaucratization of adjudication power in china and the separation of the trial and judgment caused by it accordingly. Apart from “introduction” and “epilogue”, the principal part of this thesis consists of five chapters, logically divided into part I and part II, which is current situation and consequence respectively.

“Introduction”: this part defines the theme of this thesis, which is the forming mechanism of the separation of trial and judgment caused by the bureaucratization of adjudication power, and also formulate the origin, background and significance of the research. And the literature review along with the principal research method and thesis frame, as well as the possible innovation and deficiency are also included in this part.

Part I: the bureaucratization evolution of judicial power in china. The two chapters included in this part try to discuss the process and characteristic of the bureaucratization of adjudication power in china. Part I is logically divided into three parts. The first part will analyze and conclude the general nature of the bureaucracy in China’s judicial system and the uniqueness with the phenomenon of reinforcement and alienation, which is different from the rational bureaucracy theory by Max Weber, from the perspective of the fundamental theory about bureaucracy. Based on the discussion of the judicial category theory of Mirjan R. Damaska, this part will bring the China’s judicial system into the perspective of his hierarchical ideal. In addition, the formulation of the structural elements of the judicial power operation, the specific definition and category of the separation of trial and judgment will also be included in this part. The second part will combine the structural elements of operation of adjudication power with the relevant theories of bureaucracy, to discover and discuss the five characteristics of the bureaucratization of adjudication power in China. The third part will apply the method of comparative analysis to formulate and explain the reason why the operation of adjudication power in other countries belonging to bureaucratic hierarchy judicial category does not fall into the orbit of bureaucracy and result in the separation of trial and judgment.

Part II: how do the separations of trial and judgment come into being? Part II will approximately combine the three dimensions of the bureaucracy and the relevant theories of bureaucracy to formulate the bureaucratization of adjudication power’s effect on the separation of trial and judgment and its specific mechanism. Firstly, as for the dimension of bureaucracy organization structure, the bureaucratization of adjudication power will lead to the deconstruction of the decision-making structure of equal rights of the two typical judicial organizations, namely the collegiate panel and the judicial committee, and the reconstruction of a hierarchical decision-making structure in abovementioned judicial organizations results in the separation of trial and judgment. Secondly, as for the dimension of the bureaucratic operation of power, this part will discuss the necessity and specific mechanism of the multiple separation of the trial and judgment in form and in essence from multiple perspectives, based on the model of the multi-level circulation of adjudication power built up according to the ideal category method by Max Weber. Moreover, as for the dimension of the management mode of bureaucracy, this part will focus on the effect put on by Bureaucratic management and control of adjudication power, to formulate the effect of the separation of trial and judgment and its forming mechanism which result from the incentive management, i.e. performance measurement, and the punitive management, i.e. the accountability system for misjudged cases, by means of economic analysis of law and the Game theory. 

“Epilogue”: this part will make a brief summary and reassert the research conclusion that the bureaucracy of China’s judicial system as well as its uniqueness lead to the bureaucratization evolution of adjudication power which then has become the fundamental factor influencing or determining the formation of the separation of trial and judgment. And then with the five characteristics of bureaucratization of adjudication power as reference, a comparative review of the system context and specific practice of the current judicial reform will come to the conclusion that the reinforcement instead of elimination of the bureaucracy factors in the ongoing reform will undoubtedly prevent the achievement of the goal which the CPC central committee put forward in the reform of adjudication power exercise mechanism.

    Research areas

  • adjudication power, operation of power, trial, judgment , separation, bureaucratization, judicial reform