Taming the Guerilla in International Arbitration?

Abstract

Witnessing the apparent adoption of guerilla tactics in international arbitration occurs notwithstanding that the arbitral process is largely shaped and dictated by party autonomy. International arbitration is growing in various ways, and any attempt to smear its reputation ought to be condemned. However, one party’s guerilla could very well be another party’s freedom fighter, and what constitutes foul play will depend on the subjective perceptions of the relevant party to the arbitration and their different backgrounds. This thesis explores the world of international arbitration and the nature of guerilla tactics in that forum. It examines the various types of guerilla tactics that might be deployed by not only the parties and their legal representatives but also the arbitrators, thereby exhibiting the potential impact of such means on the arbitral process. It further scrutinizes the possible factors that enable the participants in international arbitration to deploy guerilla tactics. The remedies to sanction misconduct in international arbitration are evaluated and compared with those available in court litigation. Recommendations are provided to try to ensure that participants exercise restraint.

Date of Award	15 Dec 2020
Original language	English
Awarding Institution	City University of Hong Kong
Supervisor	Julien Laurent CHAISSE (Supervisor) & Noam ZAMIR (Supervisor)