I conduct two empirical studies of internationalization of firms from less
developed countries from entry mode choice and M&A performance perspectives.
The two studies examine the two phases of Chinese firms. Essay one focus on firms’
entry choice before entering into a foreign market. Essay two examines the firms’
performance after going abroad.
The first study integrates transaction cost economics and institutional theory to
propose a contingency model of multinational enterprises’ ownership control designs.
I posit that asset specificity and complementarity influence the design of ownership
control, which is further affected by the specific institutional environment.
Furthermore, I argue that regulatory distance and normative distance display
differentiating moderations on the main effects. Regulatory distance is found to
strengthen the positive effect of asset specificity on ownership control, while
normative distance enhances the negative effect of asset complementarity on
ownership control.
In second study, I propose to substitute “cultural distance” with “cultural friction”.
Because compared to cultural distance, cultural friction focuses more on conflict
occurring in the process of acquisition. Moreover, when there is cultural friction in the
acquisition process, the negative effects of such friction on post-acquisition
performance worsen to the extent that TMT educational background is diversified.
Political ties with local government were also found to have a partially negative effect
on the relationship between two collaborating parties.
| Date of Award | 2 Oct 2015 |
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| Original language | English |
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| Awarding Institution | - City University of Hong Kong
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| Supervisor | Chenting SU (Supervisor) |
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- Developing countries
- Consolidation and merger of corporations
- International business enterprises
- Developing countries.
Entry mode choice and M&A performance: the internationalization of firms in less developed countries
ZHANG, Y. (Author). 2 Oct 2015
Student thesis: Doctoral Thesis