Dictatorship, Democracy and Decentralization: The Politics of Institutional Change in Pakistan

Abstract

Over the past few decades development theorists and policy analysts have put an overarching focus on institutional reforms as the key driver of change in developing countries. Decentralization reforms have been a critical aspect of this institutional reform agenda. Proponents of decentralization have emphasized its theorized benefits, including improved efficiency and equity, better service delivery, and more responsive governance. Yet the empirical evidence regarding such theorized benefits remains inconclusive at best. Whether and under what conditions decentralization measures can generate their promised benefits is a question of interest to scholars and analysts of development around the world and is a key concern of this study.
This study seeks to contribute to existing scholarship on the political economy of development, decentralization and institutional change through an analysis of the implementation and outcomes of institutional reforms in Pakistan between the years 2000 and 2010. At the center of the analysis is General Pervez Musharraf’s Devolution Plan (DP) and a closely associated package of reform assistance provided to Pakistan under the World Bank-supported Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP) initiative.
Promulgated by General Musharraf during 2000, the DP aimed to address weaknesses in state governance, resource distribution and the delivery of essential services. The DP entailed the introduction of wholly new institutional arrangements, such as the Local Government System (LGS) and the Provincial Finance Commission (PFC). In terms of design and the extent of devolution of power and resources, the DP demonstrated significant departures from previous attempts at decentralization. While achieving some of its goals at the outset, implementation of the DP subsequently faltered in the face of a range of particularistic interests until its reversal in 2009/10. This study traces the introduction and ultimate demise of the Devolution Plan nationally and through a case study of two districts of Khyber Pukhtunkhwa (KPK) province. Rather than seeking to explain the socioeconomic effects of decentralization reforms initiative, the study investigates and seeks to explain how the implementation of these initiatives affected institutional development in KPK province.
The rise and ultimate demise of the DP not only raises questions about the conditions under which decentralization reforms can achieve their intended outcomes but also about the assumptions underlying policies aimed at promoting development through institutional reforms. As this and other studies demonstrate, the impacts of decentralization reforms are often more complex and contingent than is commonly assumed.
This study uses the case of Pakistan to contribute to existing theories of institutions and institutional change. The study takes stock of different variants of institutionalism, including rational choice, historical, organizational/sociological and conflict approaches and examines the adequacy of each for explaining the pattern of observed institutional change in Pakistan. Data collection for the study was undertaken in Pakistan and included extensive fieldworks in two districts of KPK province, Lower Dir and Swabi districts. Primary data was collected through over 100 semi-structured in-depth interviews and in very few cases also through focus group discussions. Data collected from secondary sources included documents such as minutes of the councils’ meetings, the annual budgets and annual development programs (ADPs) of councils, communiqués between provincial and local governments and provincial finance commission (PFC) awards etc.
It is reasonable to expect that decentralization reforms undertaken by a military dictatorship would be bound to fail, given that military dictators are presumed to lack the political will or incentive to genuinely decentralize power. This study, however, suggests that while Musharraf’s use of decentralization reforms was indeed intended to expand his power base and garner political support, the implementation and outcomes of the DP owed principally not to Musharraf’s lack of political will or to limits to decentralization embodied in the design of the DP, but rather to the particularistic interests of an elected provincial government which perceived decentralization as a threat to its political and material interests and successfully undermined its implementation.
At the outset, General Musharraf used the DP to legitimize his regime and to undermine his political rivals and later on appropriated it to further entrench his power by garnering political support through nazimeen (mayors) for his presidential referendum during April 2002. However, despite an explicit ban stipulated in the Local Government Ordinance (LGO), political parties hostile to the DP managed to capture positions of power in the local councils by adroitly evading the statutes of the LGO 2000. The presence of parties in the local councils provided an impetus for preserving clientelistic politics, with attendant effects on the distribution of resources and the formation and functioning of monitoring committees.
Prospects for the implementation of the DP declined further in 2002 when Mutahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA), an alliance of religious parties with nominal representation at the local levels, won competitive elections and thereby assumed control over the reins of provincial government. Perceiving the DP as a threat to its authority, the MMA initiated a campaign to undermine the LGS, beginning with the introduction of a litany of amendments to the NWFP Local Government Ordinance 2000, aimed at clawing back the powers of the LGS. It then subverted the statutes of the PFC governing inter- governmental (among KPK districts) resource distribution, thereby illicitly privileging some districts at the expense of others. Finally, upon the expiry of constitutional protection in 2008/09, a period that also corresponds to the ousting of Musharraf from power, the provincial government revoked the system of local self-governance altogether.
Whether under democracy or dictatorship, outcomes of decentralization reforms are contingent on subnational power holders. The case of Pakistan reminds us that a priori assumptions about the benefits of a well-designed decentralization scheme or of the interests and limitations of dictatorial regimes are in and of themselves insufficient for understanding and explaining processes and outcomes of decentralization in practice. The case of Devolution Plan and its internationally-supported reform components demonstrate that outcomes of institutional reform initiatives are determined not simply by the design of such schemes but by the competitive and conflictual social relations that underlie institutional change within specific historical settings.

Date of Award	13 Jan 2016
Original language	English
Awarding Institution	City University of Hong Kong
Supervisor	Jonathan Daniel LONDON (Supervisor) & Catherine C H CHIU (Supervisor)