Abstract
The mixed ownership economy of state-owned capital, collective capital and private capital is an important realization form of the basic economic system. The development of mixed ownership economy has become an important part of China's economic system reform. In particular, since the Third Plenary Session of the 18th CPC Central Committee, the reform of mixed ownership of state-owned firms has entered a stage from a hierarchical pilot to a comprehensive and rapid promotion, both the policy support for state-owned firms that introduce private capital and private shareholders who hold share of state-owned firms, and the positive response and evaluation for the reform of mixed ownership of state-owned firms in the capital market, strongly promote the leap of state-owned firms from "attracting capital" to "transferring mechanism". At the same time, with the vigorous development of private economy in all walks of life, the status of private economy in the national economic system is becoming more and more important. However, problems such as the poor risk-taking ability, the low accuracy of grasping policy direction, the difficulty in financing and the high cost of financing restrict the transformation and upgrading of private economy. At this time, the introduction of state-owned capital to guide and revitalize private capital, drive the industrial upgrading under the technological change and promote the high-quality sustainable development of private firms becomes particularly important. The reverse mixed ownership reform of private firms has become one of the key tasks of China's economic system reform.On the other hand, in the past three decades, China's capital market has developed rapidly, advancing in the reform, and constantly carrying out the reform and improvement of the system and supervision mode. In recent years, how to improve the information environment of the capital market has become one of the hot topics. The information environment of the capital market is related to the efficiency of investors to obtain the information of listed firms and make investment decisions accordingly, which affects the efficiency of resource allocation of the capital market. This paper focuses on the pricing efficiency in capital market under the background of mixed ownership reform, that is, the impact of mixed ownership structure of state-owned firms and private firms on the capital market pricing efficiency. This issue is not only related to the effectiveness of the mixed ownership reform’s system design, but also related to information risk prevention under the goal of efficient, sustainable and healthy development in the capital market.
In order to test the above questions, this paper selects A-share non-financial state-owned listed firms and private listed firms in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock market from 2014 to 2018 as samples for empirical research. The results of research on the impact of state-owned firms’ mixed ownership on the capital market pricing efficiency show that: (1) the introduction of private shareholders can significantly reduce the stock price synchronization of state-owned firms, improve the capital market pricing efficiency; (2) the positive impact of private shareholders on the capital market pricing efficiency of state-owned enterprises is more significant in the samples with more serious agency problems, more abundant proprietary information and higher degree of internal and external environmental protection;(3) private shareholders improve the capital market pricing efficiency of state-owned firms mainly through improving the adequacy of information disclosure, increasing media attention, increasing the frequency of shareholders' meetings and improving stock liquidity;(4) in terms of equity participation, the higher the share proportion of private shareholders, the higher the capital market pricing efficiency is; (5) in the dimension of high-level governance, private shareholders' participation in high-level governance can significantly improve the capital market pricing efficiency of state-owned enterprises, especially the dispatched directors and supervisors can play a positive role; (6) compared with the private firms without holding shares of state-owned firms, the private firms holding shares of state-owned firms have higher stock price synchronization and lower capital market pricing efficiency.
The results of research on the impact of mixed ownership of private firms on the capital market pricing efficiency show that: (1) the introduction of state-owned shareholders can significantly improve the synchronization of stock price and reduce the capital market pricing efficiency; (2) the negative impact of introducing state-owned shareholders on the capital market pricing efficiency of private firms is more significant in the samples with weak external supervision, strong industry competition and poor availability of government resources;(3) after the introduction of state-owned shareholders, the adequacy of information disclosure is reduced, the frequency of shareholders' meeting and board meeting is reduced, the policy burden is increased, the debt maturity structure is extended, and the stock liquidity is reduced, which lead to the reduction of capital market pricing efficiency;(4) in terms of equity participation, a higher proportion of shares can encourage state-owned shareholders to play a supervisory role and alleviate the negative impact of the introduction of state-owned shareholders on the capital market pricing efficiency; (5) in the dimension of high-level governance, state-owned shareholders' participation in high-level governance can significantly reduce the stock price synchronization of private firms, especially when they appoint supervisors; (6) compared with the state-owned firms without holding shares of private firms, the state-owned firms holding shares of private firms have higher stock price synchronization and lower capital market pricing efficiency.
The academic contribution of this paper is reflected in three aspects. Firstly, it supplements the literature on the economic consequences of mixed ownership structure, and verifies the spillover effect of mixed ownership structure on capital market from the perspective of information environment and pricing efficiency. Secondly, it supplements the literature on the reform of state-owned firms and the development of private economy, and proves by using empirical data that the introduction of private shareholders in state-owned firms can improve the supervision and incentive to the management, balance the state-owned shareholders, and increase the information content of stock price. At the same time, it also proves that the introduction of state-owned shareholders in private firms weakens the motivation of information disclosure. From the perspective of pricing efficiency, it proves the positive significance of the reform of state-owned firms and the information risk of private firms introducing state-owned capital. Thirdly, it supplements the literature on the influencing factors of capital market pricing efficiency, and analyzes the influence of heterogeneous shareholders on capital market pricing efficiency from the perspective of private shareholders' alleviating the agency problem of state-owned firms, state-owned shareholders' providing implicit guarantee for private firms and exerting political intervention on the information environment of state-owned firms and private firms.
The practical significance of this paper is also reflected in three aspects. Firstly, it provides empirical support for the design of mixed ownership reform mechanism at the present stage, helps policy-making departments optimize the classified supervision system of mixed ownership reform, strengthens the identification and judgment of mixed ownership reform motivation, mixed ownership reform path and mixed ownership reform effect, and truly makes an effective transition from "mixed capital" to "transfer mechanism"; Secondly, it provides empirical support for the policy-making of improving the resource allocation efficiency in the capital market, and helps the capital market supervision institutions to make timely and effective pre-judgment, in-process review and post tracking on the participants of mixed ownership reform with different property rights, so as to give full play to the positive impact of mixed ownership structure on the capital market pricing efficiency, at the same time, it can restrain the potential negative influence; Thirdly, it increases investors' attention to the mixed ownership structure of listed firms, helps small and medium-sized investors estimate the potential risks when making investment plans, obtain more proprietary information about the listed firms, screen out the factors that may affect the investment risk and adjust investment decisions in time, finally reduce the investment risk of small and medium-sized investors.
| Date of Award | 19 Jul 2022 |
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| Original language | Chinese (Traditional) |
| Awarding Institution |
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| Supervisor | Yaxuan QI (Supervisor) & Jianqiao HONG (External Supervisor) |
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