市場競爭、高管薪酬激勵對企業非效率投資影響研究

Abstract

The phenomenon of inefficient investment by enterprises has become one of the core obstacles hindering China's economy to move towards the stage of high-quality development. Faced with the challenges of the new era, it has become an urgent task for enterprises to improve investment efficiency, fine resource allocation and eliminate resource redundancy. Market competition, as a powerful external driving force, deeply intervenes in corporate governance by means of multiple means such as bankruptcy pressure, reputation leverage and information transparency, and has a profound impact on the investment strategy of enterprises. The construction of efficient executive compensation incentive mechanism has become an effective strategy to alleviate the internal principal-agent contradiction and curb the inefficient investment behavior. In view of the differences in the competitive situation among different industries, the intensity of constraints on senior executives is different, which leads to the effect of executive compensation incentive on improving the investment efficiency of enterprises also shows obvious industry characteristics and differentiation.

In view of the above background, this paper first analyzes the theoretical framework of information asymmetry, principal-agent, market competition and optimal compensation contract in depth, aiming to clarify the complex relationship between market competition, executive compensation incentive mechanism and inefficient investment, as well as how market competition affects executive compensation incentive strategy, and then puts forward six core hypotheses. Then, based on the rich data samples of 9,498 listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share markets from 2010 to 2019, including 1,172 state-owned enterprises and 8,326 non-state-owned enterprises, this paper builds a rigorous empirical model. Through descriptive statistics, correlation analysis and multiple linear regression of the full sample data, sample data of state-owned enterprises and sample data of non-state-owned enterprises, this paper not only systematically discusses the comprehensive impact of market competition and executive compensation incentives on enterprises' inefficient investment behavior, but also further subdivides the market environment. This paper deeply analyzes the differential effect of executive compensation incentive under different competitive intensity, and successfully validates all research hypotheses. In addition, finally, in order to ensure the robustness and reliability of the research conclusions, this paper carried out a comprehensive robustness test for each model, and further consolidated the solid foundation of the research results.

Finally, the following six conclusions are obtained: (1) Inefficient investment exists widely in China's A-share listed enterprises, and two forms of over-investment and under-investment exist at the same time, and compared with over-investment, the problem of under-investment is more severe and common. (2) There is a nonlinear correlation between the competitive position of enterprises and inefficient investment (including over-investment and under-investment), which is manifested as a typical "U" -shaped curve relationship. In the initial stage of enterprise competition, the enhancement of enterprise competitive strength significantly inhibits the inefficient investment behavior; However, when the competitive position of firms crosses a certain critical value, that is, the peak of the "U" shaped curve, the effect reverses, and the higher competitive position of firms promotes the inefficient investment. (3) The intensification of industry competition has a significant negative correlation with inefficient investment, over-investment and under-investment behavior of enterprises. (4) Both executive monetary compensation and equity incentive mechanism can effectively curb the inefficient investment tendency of enterprises, and the incentive effect of executive monetary compensation is more prominent, and the two incentive methods show more significant binding force in combating excessive investment. (5) The fierce competition in the market has a significant role in promoting the executive compensation incentive mechanism to inhibit inefficient investment. (6) Compared with state-owned enterprises, the inhibiting effect of market competition and executive incentive mechanism on inefficient investment is more significant in non-state-owned enterprises.

According to the above conclusions, this paper puts forward the following countermeasures and suggestions: (1) Improve the market competition mechanism, ensure healthy market competition, and give full play to the advantages of market competition. (2) Build an efficient and fair executive compensation incentive system, and appropriately increase the compensation incentive. (3) Make scientific use of the relationship between product market competition and executive compensation incentive, so that executive compensation incentive can cooperate with market competition mechanism to exert its governance effectiveness to a greater extent. (4) Strengthen the construction of internal governance mechanism and enhance the strength of enterprises.

The research of this paper provides empirical basis for understanding the investment behavior of enterprises, optimizing the design of executive compensation and giving play to the governance role of market competition. It is expected to provide practical guidance for corporate governance, compensation system design and market competition environment improvement, help enterprises to achieve sustainable development, and promote the health and stability of the capital market.

Date of Award	9 Apr 2025
Original language	Chinese (Traditional)
Awarding Institution	City University of Hong Kong
Supervisor	Pinliang LUO (External Supervisor) & Yong WANG (Supervisor)