中國上市公司控股股東股權質押動機、可能的經濟後果以及政府"紓困"計畫的實證研究

Abstract

As one of financing tools, share pledging facilitates the external financing for controlling shareholders of the listed companies. Share pledging does not transfer the ownership of the shares, thus has little effect on the controlling rights of the controlling shareholders. It has since become a popular tool for the controlling shareholders to acquire external capital within the Chinese government's regulatory framework. Before 2013, China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) only allowed over-the-counter share pledge. Shareholders could pledge their shares to the banks or the trust companies for financing. However, the procedures of share pledging were complicated and not facilitating. In 2013, the CSRC changed its regulation and shareholders could acquire credit from the securities companies by share pledging. In contrast to share pledging with banks, the securities companies have less information asymmetry and are more familiar with business of share pledging by the listed companies. Thus, the share pledging business experienced rapid growth since 2013. Yet in 2014 and 2015, China stock market went through dramatic transition from bull to bear market. During this period, shareholders utilized share pledging as the leverage to enlarge their profits but also losses. This led to higher stock market volatilities and investment risk. When the fall of stock price triggered a margin call, the pledged shares would be forced to sell off if shareholders could not meet the margin requirements, leading to worse price crash. The stock market was deteriorated by the fact that most controlling shareholders of the listed companies engaged in share pledging financing. By the end of 2017, some controlling shareholders even pledged all their shares. To alleviate the risk on the stability of stock market, Chinese government implemented a series of bail-out plans, which were called 'Shu Kun' plans in Chinese.

As one of financing tools, share pledging provides more financing options for listed companies as well as investors. In the meantime, such financing also has negative effects. Share pledging financing has attracted increased attentions from the academia and the industry. What are the motivations for controlling shareholders to pledge their shares? What are the effects of share pledging on the firm's operating and stock performance? How does share pledging affect the stock price volatility? What are the real effects of the bail-out plans? Existing studies have not tackled these questions yet. With this background, this thesis systematically investigates the share pledging financing based on Chinese listed companies.

This thesis uses Chinese A-share listed companies from 2003 to 2018 as the sample for empirical studies. Firstly, this thesis investigates the motivation of controlling shareholders to pledge shares for external financing. More specifically, this study focuses on the financial constraints of the firms and examines their impacts on share pledging financing. Secondly, this thesis discusses the economic consequences of controlling shareholders' share pledging and studies the relationship between the level of share pledging and the operating and stock performance of the listed companies. In addition, this study investigates the impact of share pledging on the stock price volatility and further discusses this relationship in the bear market context. Lastly, this thesis analyzes the stock price response to the 'bail-out' packages from the government when the listed companies accept them.

The conclusions of this thesis include: (1) Controlling shareholders of the firms with heavy financial constraints are more likely to engage in share pledging financing. This study finds that one essential motivation for share pledging financing of controlling shareholders is to maximize their own benefits instead of the company's welfare. (2) The level of share pledging tends to be negatively related with the operating and stock performance of the listed firm in the next financial year. The result shows that share pledging of the controlling shareholders has detrimental impacts on firm's performance. A major motivation for controlling shareholders to pledge shares is to expropriate the minority shareholders. (3) The controlling shareholders' share pledging could enhance the stock price volatility and this relationship is more distinct in the bear market. (4) Investors could earn positive abnormal returns on the announcement date when a firm obtains the 'bail-out' package, and the positive abnormal returns are higher for the small firms. The result illustrates that capital market are positively affected by the government's 'bail-out' package, particularly for the small firms.

The contributions of this thesis are as follows: (1) This thesis employs large sample study using the share pledging data in China where the listed companies of the controlling shareholders are required to disclose share pledging information. This contributes to in-depth understanding of share pledging financing. (2) This study investigates the motivations of controlling shareholders' share pledging under financial constraints and discusses the economic consequence of share pledging on the operating and stock performance of the listed companies. In addition, this paper evaluates the effect of 'bail-out' policy and reveals that the government plays a crucial role in maintaining the stability of the stock market. (3) This thesis systematically discusses the motivation of share pledging of the controlling shareholders of the company, share pledging's impact on the company and the stock price. It contributes to in-depth investigations from a variety of the perspectives on the controlling shareholders' share pledging, particularly the share pledging behaviors in the Chinese stock market. Furthermore, this thesis shows the important role of the government in maintaining the overall financial and economic stability. It also based on empirical evidence provides policy advice for the government to implement the bail-out plan and to help alleviate the difficult financing situations of small and medium private enterprises. The thesis provides systematic study of share pledging, investigates its motivations, its market reactions and the government's bail-out packages and their effect on stock price.

Date of Award	27 Apr 2021
Original language	Chinese (Traditional)
Awarding Institution	City University of Hong Kong
Supervisor	Yue MA (Supervisor)