TY - GEN
T1 - Your IoTs Are (Not) Mine
T2 - 49th Annual IEEE/IFIP International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks, DSN 2019
AU - Chen, Jiongyi
AU - Zuo, Chaoshun
AU - Diao, Wenrui
AU - Dong, Shuaike
AU - Zhao, Qingchuan
AU - Sun, Menghan
AU - Lin, Zhiqiang
AU - Zhang, Yinqian
AU - Zhang, Kehuan
N1 - Publication details (e.g. title, author(s), publication statuses and dates) are captured on an “AS IS” and “AS AVAILABLE” basis at the time of record harvesting from the data source. Suggestions for further amendments or supplementary information can be sent to [email protected].
PY - 2019/6/1
Y1 - 2019/6/1
N2 - Nowadays, IoT clouds are increasingly deployed to facilitate users to manage and control their IoT devices. Unlike the traditional cloud services with communication between a client and a server, IoT cloud architectures involve three parties: The IoT device, the user, and the cloud. Before a user can remotely access her IoT device, remote communication between them is bootstrapped through the cloud. However, the security implications of such a unique process in IoT are less understood today. In this paper, we report the first step towards systematic analyses of IoT remote binding. To better understand the problem, we describe the life cycle of remote binding with a state-machine model which helps us demystify the complexity in various designs and systematically explore the attack surfaces. With the evaluation of 10 real-world remote binding solutions, our study brings to light questionable practices in the designs of authentication and authorization, including inappropriate use of device IDs, weak device authentication, and weak cloud-side access control, as well as the impact of the discovered problems, which could cause sensitive user data leak, persistent denial-ofservice, connection disruption, and even stealthy device control.
AB - Nowadays, IoT clouds are increasingly deployed to facilitate users to manage and control their IoT devices. Unlike the traditional cloud services with communication between a client and a server, IoT cloud architectures involve three parties: The IoT device, the user, and the cloud. Before a user can remotely access her IoT device, remote communication between them is bootstrapped through the cloud. However, the security implications of such a unique process in IoT are less understood today. In this paper, we report the first step towards systematic analyses of IoT remote binding. To better understand the problem, we describe the life cycle of remote binding with a state-machine model which helps us demystify the complexity in various designs and systematically explore the attack surfaces. With the evaluation of 10 real-world remote binding solutions, our study brings to light questionable practices in the designs of authentication and authorization, including inappropriate use of device IDs, weak device authentication, and weak cloud-side access control, as well as the impact of the discovered problems, which could cause sensitive user data leak, persistent denial-ofservice, connection disruption, and even stealthy device control.
KW - Internet of Things
KW - Security Analysis
KW - System Security
UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/85072105530
UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/85072105530#tab=impact
U2 - 10.1109/DSN.2019.00034
DO - 10.1109/DSN.2019.00034
M3 - RGC 32 - Refereed conference paper (with host publication)
SN - 9781728100562
T3 - Proceedings - 49th Annual IEEE/IFIP International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks, DSN 2019
SP - 222
EP - 233
BT - Proceedings - 49th Annual IEEE/IFIP International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks, DSN 2019
PB - IEEE
Y2 - 24 June 2019 through 27 June 2019
ER -