TY - JOUR
T1 - When Differential Privacy Meets Query Control
T2 - A Hybrid Framework for Practical Range Query Leakage Quantification and Mitigation
AU - Li, Xinyan
AU - Du, Yuefeng
AU - Wang, Cong
PY - 2025/3
Y1 - 2025/3
N2 - Encrypted range schemes are becoming increasingly attractive for commercial databases, as they allow for confidential query service on encrypted databases hosted on remote servers. These schemes, by design, leak specific patterns such as access, volume, and search patterns. However, they are vulnerable to leakage-abuse attacks (LAAs) that exploit these patterns to reconstruct the plaintext databases. In response, the query control paradigms have emerged, with our preceding framework, RangeQC, being a notable example. These paradigms probe deeper into the intricacies of granular user query access control, advancing beyond past scheme-level efforts and acting as sentinels against the inadvertent leakage of delicate data patterns. While RangeQC aimed to regulate high-leakage queries through query control, it encountered usability impediments. Acknowledging that query control alone might be insufficient, we introduce an additional layer of protection in our evolved framework, RangeQC+. This fusion model combines query control with differential privacy-based data perturbation, a proactive strategy to muddle query responses and yield obfuscated leakage patterns. Complementing this approach, RangeQC+ incorporates refined, noise-resistant leakage metrics for accurate pattern analysis. Through comprehensive assessments and comparative analysis, RangeQC+ consistently showcases a balanced blend of enhanced performance, robust privacy, and user-friendly functionality. © 2024 IEEE.
AB - Encrypted range schemes are becoming increasingly attractive for commercial databases, as they allow for confidential query service on encrypted databases hosted on remote servers. These schemes, by design, leak specific patterns such as access, volume, and search patterns. However, they are vulnerable to leakage-abuse attacks (LAAs) that exploit these patterns to reconstruct the plaintext databases. In response, the query control paradigms have emerged, with our preceding framework, RangeQC, being a notable example. These paradigms probe deeper into the intricacies of granular user query access control, advancing beyond past scheme-level efforts and acting as sentinels against the inadvertent leakage of delicate data patterns. While RangeQC aimed to regulate high-leakage queries through query control, it encountered usability impediments. Acknowledging that query control alone might be insufficient, we introduce an additional layer of protection in our evolved framework, RangeQC+. This fusion model combines query control with differential privacy-based data perturbation, a proactive strategy to muddle query responses and yield obfuscated leakage patterns. Complementing this approach, RangeQC+ incorporates refined, noise-resistant leakage metrics for accurate pattern analysis. Through comprehensive assessments and comparative analysis, RangeQC+ consistently showcases a balanced blend of enhanced performance, robust privacy, and user-friendly functionality. © 2024 IEEE.
KW - Searchable encryption
KW - cryptographic databases
KW - leakage-abuse attack
KW - range query
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85212343935&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - https://www.scopus.com/record/pubmetrics.uri?eid=2-s2.0-85212343935&origin=recordpage
U2 - 10.1109/TSC.2024.3517316
DO - 10.1109/TSC.2024.3517316
M3 - RGC 21 - Publication in refereed journal
SN - 1939-1374
VL - 18
SP - 1137
EP - 1151
JO - IEEE Transactions on Services Computing
JF - IEEE Transactions on Services Computing
IS - 2
ER -