Upstream collusion and downstream managerial incentives

Junsong Bian; Kin Keung Lai; Zhongsheng Hua

doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2012.09.034

Upstream collusion and downstream managerial incentives

Junsong Bian, Kin Keung Lai, Zhongsheng Hua

Research output: Journal Publications and Reviews › RGC 21 - Publication in refereed journal › peer-review

11 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We investigate the effects of downstream firms' managerial incentives on upstream collusion. Downstream profit-and-revenue incentive schemes make upstream manufacturers easier to collude than a pure-profit incentive scheme does when retailers compete in prices. However, the opposite occurs under quantity competition. © 2012 Elsevier B.V.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	97-100
Journal	Economics Letters
Volume	118
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2012.09.034
Publication status	Published - Jan 2013

Research Keywords

Collusion
Incentive
Price and quantity competition
Vertical channel

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title = "Upstream collusion and downstream managerial incentives",

abstract = "We investigate the effects of downstream firms' managerial incentives on upstream collusion. Downstream profit-and-revenue incentive schemes make upstream manufacturers easier to collude than a pure-profit incentive scheme does when retailers compete in prices. However, the opposite occurs under quantity competition. {\textcopyright} 2012 Elsevier B.V.",

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author = "Junsong Bian and Lai, {Kin Keung} and Zhongsheng Hua",

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AB - We investigate the effects of downstream firms' managerial incentives on upstream collusion. Downstream profit-and-revenue incentive schemes make upstream manufacturers easier to collude than a pure-profit incentive scheme does when retailers compete in prices. However, the opposite occurs under quantity competition. © 2012 Elsevier B.V.

KW - Collusion

KW - Incentive

KW - Price and quantity competition

KW - Vertical channel

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DO - 10.1016/j.econlet.2012.09.034

M3 - RGC 21 - Publication in refereed journal

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JO - Economics Letters

JF - Economics Letters

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ER -

Upstream collusion and downstream managerial incentives

Abstract

Research Keywords

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