Upstream collusion and downstream managerial incentives

Research output: Journal Publications and Reviews (RGC: 21, 22, 62)21_Publication in refereed journalpeer-review

3 Scopus Citations
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Author(s)

  • Junsong Bian
  • Kin Keung Lai
  • Zhongsheng Hua

Related Research Unit(s)

Detail(s)

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)97-100
Journal / PublicationEconomics Letters
Volume118
Issue number1
Publication statusPublished - Jan 2013

Abstract

We investigate the effects of downstream firms' managerial incentives on upstream collusion. Downstream profit-and-revenue incentive schemes make upstream manufacturers easier to collude than a pure-profit incentive scheme does when retailers compete in prices. However, the opposite occurs under quantity competition. © 2012 Elsevier B.V.

Research Area(s)

  • Collusion, Incentive, Price and quantity competition, Vertical channel

Citation Format(s)

Upstream collusion and downstream managerial incentives. / Bian, Junsong; Lai, Kin Keung; Hua, Zhongsheng.

In: Economics Letters, Vol. 118, No. 1, 01.2013, p. 97-100.

Research output: Journal Publications and Reviews (RGC: 21, 22, 62)21_Publication in refereed journalpeer-review