环境第三方监测中的激励、行为、成效分析 : 以空气质量监测中的委托-代理关系为例

Incentives, behavior, and effectiveness in environmental third-party monitoring: A case study of principal-agent relationship in air quality monitoring

Research output: Journal Publications and Reviews (RGC: 21, 22, 62)21_Publication in refereed journalpeer-review

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Detail(s)

Original languageChinese (Simplified)
Journal / Publication中國地質大學學報(社會科學版)
Publication statusAccepted/In press/Filed - 10 Jun 2021

Abstract

This paper investigates the principal-agent problem in acquiring air quality monitoring data by administrative means in the context of multi-level environmental governance, and uses Shandong Province as an example to show how the corresponding contractual risks can be reduced through market-based means. We find that the Environmental Protection Bureau of Shandong Province reduces the risk of extortion due to asset exclusivity by setting entry criteria for participating bidding firms for the operation and maintenance of air quality monitoring equipment and data comparison, and improves the enforceability of incentives and penalties by signing performance contracts that directly link remuneration to the performance of monitoring services. These institutional arrangements improve the operational efficiency of air quality monitoring, facilitate the observation and control of relevant inputs, operational processes and quality of monitoring data, and create effective accountability for O&M units. Shandong Province's practical experience enriches the theory and practice of multi-level environmental governance and provides a useful reference for China and other countries to achieve institutional construction for sustainable development. In such a vast country like China, in order to provide efficient and accurate basic information for national environmental decision-making, it is necessary to pay close attention to and systematically analyze how monitoring services are outsourced at the provincial and sub-provincial levels of government, and their impact on the efficiency and data accuracy of monitoring services.

Research Area(s)

  • 委托代理理论, 空气污染, 空气质量检测, 环境治理, Principal-agent Theory, Air Pollution, Air Quality Monitoring, Environmental Enforcement

Bibliographic Note

Information for this record is supplemented by the author(s) concerned.