期权激励、媒体关注与税收激进行为 : 基于媒体情绪的公司治理机制研究

Option incentives, media coverage and tax aggressive : The corporate governance mechanism of media from coverage mode perspective

Research output: Journal Publications and Reviews (RGC: 21, 22, 62)21_Publication in refereed journalpeer-review

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Detail(s)

Original languageChinese (Simplified)
Pages (from-to)1-11
Journal / Publication管理工程学报
Volume33
Issue number1
Publication statusPublished - Jan 2019

Abstract

基于期权激励收益风险的不对称特性,本文从管理者风险偏好视角研究期权激励对税收激进行为的影响,检验媒体关注的外部监督作用,探究不同媒体情绪对媒体发挥监督作用的影响。在控制内生性的基础上,以2011-2014中国A股上市公司为研究样本,使用上市公司媒体新闻报道的大数据分析作为媒体关注的代理变量,进行了实证研究,结果发现:期权激励可以有效提升管理者的风险偏好,提高其税收激进程度,同时媒体关注由于加速信息传递,暴露上市公司问题等功能,可以有效发挥外部监督作用,抑制税收激进行为。另外,不同的媒体情绪对其发挥外部监督作用的结果也有很大的影响,在极端正面或极端负面的媒体情绪下,媒体关注的外部监督作用会得到增强。研究拓展了期权激励研究领域,将媒体关注研究推进到媒体情绪层面,有着重要的理论和实际意义。
The separation of ownership and control in modern corporations creates a conflict between shareholders and managers. Based on equity incentives, executive compensation contracts are one potential mechanism for aligning the interests of stakeholders, which can expose the managers’ wealth to the fluctuation of stock price. Compared to stock incentives, options could stimulate the risk aggressiveness of managers owing to its convex function. The primary purpose of this paper is to explore whether option incentives are positively related to managers’ tax aggressiveness propensity.
However, every coin has two sides. The high sensitivity of managers’ wealth to stock price offered by options holdings motivates managers to engage in short-termism behavior of inflating current stock price at the expense of long-term firm value by manipulating accounting numbers, and even educing future stock crashes. Therefore, we want to investigate whether there exists an effective corporate governance mechanism to limit this effect. Considering the function of information spreading, we regard media coverage as an effective external supervision mechanism to restrict the excessive aggressiveness from option incentives. Moreover, we explore this supervision function under different coverage modes.
After controlling endogenous problem, we chose listed companies in Chinese capital market from 2011-2014 as our research sample and use big-data analysis to identify the proxy variable of media coverage to implement empirical research. The result shows that option incentives are an effective way to motivate managers’ risk appetite, encourage a company to take a more aggressive tax position. However, media coverage plays a vital role in external supervision mechanism to constrain this aggressive behavior by exposing the company under the general public.
Moreover, we examined the function of media coverage under different coverage modes, and found that the supervision effect would increase in extreme consensus environment(both extreme positive and extreme negative environments). Compared to options, we didn’t find the same result on stock incentives in future researches due to the symmetric influence of risks and returns, which further justifies the risk-stimulus function of option incentives. These results are still robust if other measurements of option incentives are chosen.
This paper extends the research of option incentives on tax aggressive area and push the research of media coverage into substantial content level, which has important theoretical and practical implications.

Research Area(s)

  • 期权激励, 税收激进, 媒体关注, 媒体情绪, Option incentives, Tax aggressiveness, Media coverage, Media mode