本文考虑由一个原始制造商和一个独立再制造商构成的两阶段模型，原始制造商在第一阶段决策产品设计的可再制造性水平，再制造商在第二阶段进入产品市场并和原始制造商进行价格竞争.原始制造商可以通过改变产品设计的可再制造性水平来控制可再制造旧产品的供应数量.相对较高可再制造性水平的产品能够直接降低再制造商的生产成本，增加原始制造商的固定成本和新产品单位生产成本，降低政府征收的生产税.利用博弈论模型，我们得出了再制造不受回收数量约束和受回收数量约束两种情况下原始制造商和再制造商的均衡决策，得到了激励原始制造商选择生产高可再制造性新产品时政府生产税应该满足的条件，探讨了原始制造商和再制造商对于政府生产税变化的反应趋势，分析了均衡决策结果的敏感性，考虑了再制造产品均衡产量、再制造商均衡利润、原始制造商均衡利润关于参数变化百分比的反应趋势.

In this paper, we formulate a two-period model in which an OM decides the remanufacturability level of products in product design in the first period, and a remanufacturer enters the product market to compete with the OM in the second period. The OM can control the supply of used remanufacturable products by changing the remanufacturability level in product design. A product with higher remanufacturability will directly decrease the production cost of the remanufacturer, increase fixed costs and variable costs of new products for the OM, and lower the producing tax to the government. Making use of game theory, we derive the equilibrium decisons for the OM and remanufacturer in the two scenarios that the collection is unconstrained or constrained. We characterize the equilibrium decisions to describe how the OM and remanufacturer behave with respect to changes in government producing tax. We analyse the sensitivity of the equilibrium decisions, and consider the trends of the equilibrium production of remanufactured products, the equilibrium profits of remanufacturer and OM with regard to the percent changes in related parameters.