Understanding the parking supply mechanism in China: A case study of Shenzhen

Parking policy in China is characterized by "high regulation in supply and mispricing." City governments rely on the "minimum parking requirement," the conventional approach, to manage parking quantity, which shapes a unique phenomenon called the "developer-led supply pattern." In this paper, we establish ordinary least squares models to explore "spatial-mismatch" characteristics that result from the current parking policy and infer the latent mechanism of parking supply using geographical correlation analysis. In the case of Shenzhen, we found that few urban factors at the district level are involved in the decision making of developers regarding parking provision, which compromises the endeavor of creating sustainable transport and thus requires further policy intervention. Market force serves its role in strict planning regulations at the neighborhood level because of the dominant role of property developers. These models not only confirm the mismatch of parking supply with the objectives of sustainable urban transport but also reveal the willingness of developers as a driving force that interacts with the regulatory environment. Such willingness leads to a spatially inconsistent, inefficient parking supply pattern over the entire Shenzhen metropolis. Based on these findings, two suggestions are made for parking policy on district and neighborhood bases that address the situation of high-density urbanization in Chinese cities and similar circumstances.