Abstract
Vehicular crowdsourcing is a promising paradigm that takes advantage of powerful onboard capabilities of vehicles to perform various tasks in smart cities. To fulfill this vision, a well-designed incentive mechanism is essential to stimulate the participation of vehicles. In this paper, we propose a timeliness-aware incentive mechanism for vehicular crowdsourcing by taking vehicle's uncertain travel time into account. In view of the stochastic nature of traffic conditions, we derive a tractable expression for the probability distribution of task delay based on a discrete-time traffic model. By leveraging reverse auction framework, we model the utility of a service requester as a function in terms of uncertain task delay and incurred payment. To maximize the requester's utility under a budget constraint, we cast the mechanism design as a non-monotone submodular maximization problem over a knapsack constraint. Based on this formulation, we develop a truthful budgeted utility maximization auction (TBUMA), which is truthful, budget feasible, profitable, individually rational and computationally efficient. Through extensive trace-based simulations, we demonstrate the effectiveness of our proposed incentive mechanism.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 3373-3387 |
| Journal | IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing |
| Volume | 21 |
| Issue number | 9 |
| Online published | 19 Jan 2021 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - Sept 2022 |
| Externally published | Yes |
UN SDGs
This output contributes to the following UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)
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SDG 11 Sustainable Cities and Communities
Research Keywords
- crowdsensing
- edge computing
- incentive mechanism
- reverse auction
- Vehicular crowdsourcing
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