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Timeliness-Aware Incentive Mechanism for Vehicular Crowdsourcing in Smart Cities

  • Xianhao Chen
  • , Lan Zhang
  • , Yawei Pang
  • , Bin Lin*
  • , Yuguang Fang
  • *Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Journal Publications and Reviews › RGC 21 - Publication in refereed journal › peer-review

Abstract

Vehicular crowdsourcing is a promising paradigm that takes advantage of powerful onboard capabilities of vehicles to perform various tasks in smart cities. To fulfill this vision, a well-designed incentive mechanism is essential to stimulate the participation of vehicles. In this paper, we propose a timeliness-aware incentive mechanism for vehicular crowdsourcing by taking vehicle's uncertain travel time into account. In view of the stochastic nature of traffic conditions, we derive a tractable expression for the probability distribution of task delay based on a discrete-time traffic model. By leveraging reverse auction framework, we model the utility of a service requester as a function in terms of uncertain task delay and incurred payment. To maximize the requester's utility under a budget constraint, we cast the mechanism design as a non-monotone submodular maximization problem over a knapsack constraint. Based on this formulation, we develop a truthful budgeted utility maximization auction (TBUMA), which is truthful, budget feasible, profitable, individually rational and computationally efficient. Through extensive trace-based simulations, we demonstrate the effectiveness of our proposed incentive mechanism.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)3373-3387
JournalIEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing
Volume21
Issue number9
Online published19 Jan 2021
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Sept 2022
Externally publishedYes

UN SDGs

This output contributes to the following UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)

  1. SDG 11 - Sustainable Cities and Communities
    SDG 11 Sustainable Cities and Communities

Research Keywords

  • crowdsensing
  • edge computing
  • incentive mechanism
  • reverse auction
  • Vehicular crowdsourcing

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