Abstract
China’s Anti-Monopoly Law came into effect in 2008. Since then, the country has been relying on both conventional public enforcement and private enforcement to combat anti-competitive conduct. Then, in 2022, China amended its Anti-Monopoly Law for the first time. Among other things, the amendment extended the then-existing public interest litigation regime to the antitrust field. Thereafter, if antitrust victims want to seek compensation, they can either (1) file a private action and claim damages by themselves or (2) ask the procuratorate to initiate a public interest litigation and claim damages for them. The rise of the new form of antitrust enforcement provides an incentive for some victims to free-ride the procuratorate’s effort, hindering the development of private antitrust enforcement in China. As a first attempt, this article examines the tension between the two forms of enforcement via cost-benefit analysis and proposes ways to mitigate its negative consequences.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 19-50 |
Number of pages | 32 |
Journal | Tsinghua China Law Review |
Volume | 16 |
Issue number | 1 |
Publication status | Published - 3 Jan 2024 |
Bibliographical note
Publication date information for this publication is provided by the author(s) concerned.Research Keywords
- Anti-Monopoly Law of China
- Public Interest Litigation
- Private Enforcement
- Free Riding
- Public Interest