The role of investment banker directors in M&A

Research output: Journal Publications and Reviews (RGC: 21, 22, 62)21_Publication in refereed journalpeer-review

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Detail(s)

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)269-286
Journal / PublicationJournal of Financial Economics
Volume112
Issue number2
Online published10 Feb 2014
Publication statusPublished - May 2014

Abstract

We examine how directors with investment banking experience affect firms' acquisition behavior. We find that firms with investment bankers on the board have a higher probability of making acquisitions. Furthermore, acquirers with investment banker directors experience higher announcement returns, pay lower takeover premiums and advisory fees, and exhibit superior long-run performance. Overall, our results suggest that directors with investment banking experience help firms make better acquisitions, both by identifying suitable targets and by reducing the cost of the deals. © 2014 Elsevier B.V.

Research Area(s)

  • Board of directors, Investment banking experience, Mergers and acquisitions

Citation Format(s)

The role of investment banker directors in M&A. / Huang, Qianqian; Jiang, Feng; Lie, Erik; Yang, Ke.

In: Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 112, No. 2, 05.2014, p. 269-286.

Research output: Journal Publications and Reviews (RGC: 21, 22, 62)21_Publication in refereed journalpeer-review