The Power of Incentivisation in Minimising Construction Disputes

Liuying Zhu, Sai On Cheung

    Research output: Chapters, Conference Papers, Creative and Literary WorksRGC 12 - Chapter in an edited book (Author)peer-review

    1 Citation (Scopus)

    Abstract

    The uncertainties found by construction projects render practice of opportunism ex post. Typically, disputes are raised to capitalise on unplanned happenings. This study discusses the role of incentivization in dispute minimization. Through literature review, it was found that unfair treatment of contractual parties is one of the underlying causes of construction disputes. When incentivization serve as ex post (i) reallocation of risks; (ii) investment in relation and (iii) patching perception of fairness, dispute can be minimized. It is therefore suggested that incentivization provide ex post relational governance that moderates ex ante risk and power asymmetry.
    Original languageEnglish
    Title of host publicationConstruction Dispute Research Expanded
    EditorsSai On Cheung
    PublisherSpringer, Cham
    Pages331-347
    ISBN (Electronic)978-3-030-80256-1
    ISBN (Print)978-3-030-80255-4
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - 2022

    Publication series

    NameSpringer Tracts in Civil Engineering
    ISSN (Print)2366-259X
    ISSN (Electronic)2366-2603

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