The market for reputation: Repeated Matching and Career Concerns

Eunhee Kim

The market for reputation: Repeated Matching and Career Concerns

Eunhee Kim^*

^*Corresponding author for this work

Department of Accountancy

Research output: Conference Papers › RGC 33 - Other conference paper › peer-review

Abstract

I propose a multiperiod matching model of firms and managers to explain that managerial career concerns may not guarantee economic efficiency in matching. In the model, firms compete for managerial talent, and managers are concerned about their reputations. Due to the trade-off between match efficiency from productive complementarity and agency costs from managers’ reputational concerns, assortative matching of firms and managers may fail. I derive necessary conditions for such failure with respect to the size distributions of firms. The model can be applied to analyzing cross sectional patterns of two-sided matching, and aggregate firm performance and agency costs.

Original language	English
Publication status	Presented - 17 Apr 2018
Event	Microeconomic Workshop 2018 - University of Tokyo, Tokyo, Japan Duration: 17 Apr 2018 → 17 Apr 2018 http://www.cirje.e.u-tokyo.ac.jp/research/workshops/micro/micro.html

Seminar

Seminar	Microeconomic Workshop 2018
Place	Japan
City	Tokyo
Period	17/04/18 → 17/04/18
Internet address	http://www.cirje.e.u-tokyo.ac.jp/research/workshops/micro/micro.html

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title = "The market for reputation: Repeated Matching and Career Concerns",

abstract = "I propose a multiperiod matching model of firms and managers to explain that managerial career concerns may not guarantee economic efficiency in matching. In the model, firms compete for managerial talent, and managers are concerned about their reputations. Due to the trade-off between match efficiency from productive complementarity and agency costs from managers{\textquoteright} reputational concerns, assortative matching of firms and managers may fail. I derive necessary conditions for such failure with respect to the size distributions of firms. The model can be applied to analyzing cross sectional patterns of two-sided matching, and aggregate firm performance and agency costs.",

author = "Eunhee Kim",

year = "2018",

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AB - I propose a multiperiod matching model of firms and managers to explain that managerial career concerns may not guarantee economic efficiency in matching. In the model, firms compete for managerial talent, and managers are concerned about their reputations. Due to the trade-off between match efficiency from productive complementarity and agency costs from managers’ reputational concerns, assortative matching of firms and managers may fail. I derive necessary conditions for such failure with respect to the size distributions of firms. The model can be applied to analyzing cross sectional patterns of two-sided matching, and aggregate firm performance and agency costs.

M3 - RGC 33 - Other conference paper

Y2 - 17 April 2018 through 17 April 2018

ER -

The market for reputation: Repeated Matching and Career Concerns

Abstract

Seminar

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