The dyadic structure of exchange partners' governing-agency social capital and opportunism in buyer–supplier relationships

Extant literature on opportunism examines its antecedents in dyadic relationships in business networks. With firms also developing relationships with government agencies, these connections can influence firms' propensity for opportunism in business exchanges. This study investigates how the governing-agency social capital on both sides of the buyer–supplier relationship affects firms' opportunism tendency toward their counterparts. In particular, we divide the governing-agency social capital of both parties into two dimensions: the asymmetry of governing-agency social capital and joint governing-agency social capital. We postulate that both the asymmetry of governing-agency social capital and joint governing-agency social capital promote the focal firm's propensity for opportunism through dyadic power and network power, respectively. Moreover, we propose that both dimensions interact to magnify each other's impact on the focal firm's propensity for opportunism. We test the hypotheses using 322 matched data of buyer–supplier dyads in China. Empirical results provide support for the research hypotheses.