The determinants and effects of board committees
Research output: Journal Publications and Reviews (RGC: 21, 22, 62) › 21_Publication in refereed journal › peer-review
Related Research Unit(s)
|Journal / Publication||Journal of Corporate Finance|
|Online published||3 Oct 2020|
|Publication status||Published - Dec 2020|
|Link to Scopus||https://www.scopus.com/record/display.uri?eid=2-s2.0-85092617525&origin=recordpage|
The governance reforms of 2003 require corporate boards to establish various committees. This paper studies how these committees are structured and the corresponding impacts. I find that independent directors with long tenures and multiple board seats tend to multitask and sit on more committees. The firms that multitask their independent directors are associated with comparatively low CEO compensation and high ROA. In particular, the benefits of multitasking independent directors are more pronounced in firms with long-tenured CEOs. I contribute to the literature by showing that board performance depends not only on the directors' identities, but also on their task assignments.
Research Unit(s) information for this publication is provided by the author(s) concerned.