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The Cost of Investor Protection: Bank Loan Contracting During SEC Investigations

Research output: Journal Publications and ReviewsRGC 21 - Publication in refereed journalpeer-review

Abstract

In examining the loan contracting implications of SEC investigations, we document that banks charge higher loan spreads when borrowers are under investigation, with the rise in interest rates varying predictably with lender characteristics. Further, our evidence implies that the debt pricing impact of SEC investigations is amplified for borrowers suffering worse credit quality and information asymmetry as well as those relying more on bank loans. These findings suggest that banks perceive increased risk for borrowers under SEC scrutiny while also leveraging their knowledge of the investigations to extract rents. Supplemental analyses reveal tighter nonspread loan terms and a higher likelihood of amending existing loan contracts during SEC investigations. Additionally, the tightening of loan terms reverses for investigations that conclude without enforcement actions. Overall, our research identifies an economic cost of SEC investigations and alerts regulators to these costs when deciding whether to launch an investigation.
© American Accounting Association
Original languageEnglish
Number of pages32
JournalAccounting Review
Online published30 Sept 2025
DOIs
Publication statusOnline published - 30 Sept 2025

Funding

We thank Urooj Khan (editor), two anonymous reviewers, Alex Aleszczyk, Dichu Bao, Yi-Chun Chen, TzuTing Chiu, Christine Cuny, Yiwei Dou, Mirko S. Heinle, Mehdi Khedmati, April Klein, Kenny Z. Lin, Jinzhi Lu, Ying Mao, Xiaojing Meng, Stephen Ryan, Sang Woo Sohn, Gurpal Sran, Qin Tan, Chong Wang, Ray R. Wang, Forester Wong, Harry F. Wu, Yangxin Yu, Yue Zhang, Liu Zheng, Frank S. Zhou, Luo Zuo, seminar participants at City University of Hong Kong and Lingnan University, and participants at the 2024 Hong Kong-Macau Junior Accounting Faculty Conference for their comments and suggestions. We also appreciate Daniel J. Taylor, Blackburne Terrence, and Eric R. Holzman for sharing their SEC investigations data with us. Emmanuel Ofosu gratefully acknowledges financial support by the start-up grant from Lingnan University (Project: SUG001/2425). The authors have no conflicts of interest to disclose.

Research Keywords

  • SEC investigation
  • bank loan contracting
  • private information
  • rent extraction
  • lending risk

Publisher's Copyright Statement

  • COPYRIGHT TERMS OF DEPOSITED FINAL PUBLISHED VERSION FILE: Yangyang Chen, Emmanuel Ofosu, Jeffrey Pittman; The Cost of Investor Protection: Bank Loan Contracting During SEC Investigations. The Accounting Review 1 January 2026; 101 (1): 203–234. https://doi.org/10.2308/TAR-2024-0405

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