Abstract
Land expropriation, during the rapid urbanization process in China, results in rural conflicts and presents barriers in sustainable development. Collective strategies of major stakeholders should be clearly understood for finding effective measures to cope with conflicts. However, the existing studies usually assume two types of stakeholders, which overlook the complicated practices as, at least central, government, local governments, and land-lost farmers are three major stakeholders. This research aims to explore the collective strategies of the three major stakeholders and examine how various factors contribute to conflicts with a tripartite evolutionary game model. The tripartite model is established based on the evolutionary game theories and relationships among the central and local governments, and land-lost farmers. A simulation analysis is also conducted on the MATLAB platform, which shows that serious asymmetry of information between stakeholders leads to the low efficiency of the game or serious conflicts. Thorough discussions on the influencing factors have also been conducted. The findings can provide good references for the central and local governments to reduce conflicts during land expropriation.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Article number | 648 |
| Journal | Sustainability (Switzerland) |
| Volume | 9 |
| Issue number | 4 |
| Online published | 21 Apr 2017 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - Apr 2017 |
UN SDGs
This output contributes to the following UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)
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SDG 2 Zero Hunger
Research Keywords
- China
- Conflict
- Evolutionary game model
- Land expropriation
- Simulation
- Tripartite game analysis
Publisher's Copyright Statement
- This full text is made available under CC-BY 4.0. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
RGC Funding Information
- RGC-funded
Fingerprint
Dive into the research topics of 'The collective strategies of major stakeholders in land expropriation: A tripartite game analysis of central government, local governments, and land-lost farmers'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.Projects
- 2 Finished
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GRF: How Green Turns into Gold? Optimizing the Dual Effect of ‘Price Premium for Green’ and ‘Cost Premium for Green’ of HK-BEAM Plus Certified Housing
ZHANG, X. (Principal Investigator / Project Coordinator), ANUMBA, C. J. (Co-Investigator), Skitmore, M. (Co-Investigator) & WU, J. (Co-Investigator)
1/01/17 → 24/12/20
Project: Research
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ECS: The Curvilinear Link between Environment Strategies and Financial Performance in the Real Estate Firms: Beyond Static Dichotomy of Allies or Adversaries
ZHANG, X. (Principal Investigator / Project Coordinator)
1/01/16 → 27/12/19
Project: Research
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