Strategic behavior and social optimization in Markovian vacation queues : The case of heterogeneous customers

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Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)278-286
Journal / PublicationEuropean Journal of Operational Research
Issue number2
Online published17 May 2012
Publication statusPublished - 16 Oct 2012
Externally publishedYes


We consider a single server queueing system in which service shuts down when no customers are present, and is resumed when the queue length reaches a given critical length. We assume customers are heterogeneous on delay sensitivity and analyze customers' strategic response to this mechanism and compare it to the overall optimal behavior. We provide algorithms to compute the equilibrium arrival rates and also derive the monotonicity of equilibrium and optimal arrival rates. We show that there may exist multiple equilibria in such a system and the optimal arrival rate may be larger or smaller than the decentralized equilibrium one. © 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Research Area(s)

  • Balking, Equilibrium analysis, Queueing, Strategic customers, Vacation queue