Abstract
We study a three-player cooperative game with transferable utility where the players may form different coalition structures. A new concept of stability of a coalition is introduced, and the existence of a stable coalition is proven. Based on this stability concept, a novel approach is given to determine sensible allocations in a grand coalition of three players. We also compare our result with classical core solution and implement our theory on a specific price model. © 2013 World Scientific Publishing Co. & Operational Research Society of Singapore.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Article number | 1340014 |
| Journal | Asia-Pacific Journal of Operational Research |
| Volume | 30 |
| Issue number | 3 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - Jun 2013 |
Research Keywords
- cooperative game
- Stability
- three-player game
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