Abstract
Using 113 staggered changes in corporate income tax rates across U.S. states, we provide evidence on how taxes affect corporate risk-taking decisions. Higher taxes reduce expected profits more for risky projects than for safe ones, as the government shares in a firm's upside but not in its downside. Consistent with this prediction, we find that risk taking is sensitive to taxes, albeit asymmetrically: the average firm reduces risk in response to a tax increase (primarily by changing its operating cycle and reducing R&D risk) but does not respond to a tax cut. We trace the asymmetry back to constraints on risk taking imposed by creditors. Finally, tax loss-offset rules moderate firms’ sensitivity to taxes by allowing firms to partly share downside risk with the government.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 669-707 |
| Journal | Journal of Accounting Research |
| Volume | 55 |
| Issue number | 3 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 1 Jun 2017 |
UN SDGs
This output contributes to the following UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)
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SDG 17 Partnerships for the Goals
Research Keywords
- corporate taxes
- G32
- H32
- risk taking
Policy Impact
- Cited in Policy Documents
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