Security of Distance-Bounding: A Survey

Gildas AVOINE; Muhammed Ali BINGÖL; Ioana BOUREANU; Srdjan ČAPKUN; Gerhard HANCKE; Süleyman KARDAŞ; Chong Hee KIM; Cédric LAURADOUX; Benjamin MARTIN; Jorge MUNILLA; Alberto PEINADO; Kasper BonnE RASMUSSEN; Dave SINGELÉE; Aslan TCHAMKERTEN; Rolando TRUJILLO-RASUA; Serge VAUDENAY

doi:10.1145/3264628

Security of Distance-Bounding: A Survey

Gildas AVOINE, Muhammed Ali BINGÖL, Ioana BOUREANU, Srdjan ČAPKUN, Gerhard HANCKE, Süleyman KARDAŞ, Chong Hee KIM, Cédric LAURADOUX, Benjamin MARTIN, Jorge MUNILLA, Alberto PEINADO, Kasper BonnE RASMUSSEN, Dave SINGELÉE, Aslan TCHAMKERTEN, Rolando TRUJILLO-RASUA, Serge VAUDENAY

Department of Computer Science

Research output: Journal Publications and Reviews › RGC 21 - Publication in refereed journal › peer-review

87 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Distance-bounding protocols allow a verifier to both authenticate a prover and evaluate whether the latter is located in his vicinity. These protocols are of particular interest in contactless systems, e.g., electronic payment or access control systems, which are vulnerable to distance-based frauds. This survey analyzes and compares in a unified manner many existing distance-bounding protocols with respect to several key security and complexity features.

Original language	English
Article number	94
Journal	ACM Computing Surveys
Volume	51
Issue number	5
Online published	Sept 2018
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1145/3264628
Publication status	Published - Dec 2018

Research Keywords

Contactless
Cryptography
Distance fraud
Distance-bounding
Information security
Mafia fraud
Proximity check
Relay attacks
Terrorist fraud

UN SDGs

This output contributes to the following UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)

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10.1145/3264628

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title = "Security of Distance-Bounding: A Survey",

abstract = "Distance-bounding protocols allow a verifier to both authenticate a prover and evaluate whether the latter is located in his vicinity. These protocols are of particular interest in contactless systems, e.g., electronic payment or access control systems, which are vulnerable to distance-based frauds. This survey analyzes and compares in a unified manner many existing distance-bounding protocols with respect to several key security and complexity features.",

keywords = "Contactless, Cryptography, Distance fraud, Distance-bounding, Information security, Mafia fraud, Proximity check, Relay attacks, Terrorist fraud",

author = "Gildas AVOINE and BING{\"O}L, {Muhammed Ali} and Ioana BOUREANU and Srdjan {\v C}APKUN and Gerhard HANCKE and S{\"u}leyman KARDA{\c S} and KIM, {Chong Hee} and C{\'e}dric LAURADOUX and Benjamin MARTIN and Jorge MUNILLA and Alberto PEINADO and RASMUSSEN, {Kasper BonnE} and Dave SINGEL{\'E}E and Aslan TCHAMKERTEN and Rolando TRUJILLO-RASUA and Serge VAUDENAY",

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doi = "10.1145/3264628",

language = "English",

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AU - AVOINE, Gildas

AU - BINGÖL, Muhammed Ali

AU - BOUREANU, Ioana

AU - ČAPKUN, Srdjan

AU - HANCKE, Gerhard

AU - KARDAŞ, Süleyman

AU - KIM, Chong Hee

AU - LAURADOUX, Cédric

AU - MARTIN, Benjamin

AU - MUNILLA, Jorge

AU - PEINADO, Alberto

AU - RASMUSSEN, Kasper BonnE

AU - SINGELÉE, Dave

AU - TCHAMKERTEN, Aslan

AU - TRUJILLO-RASUA, Rolando

AU - VAUDENAY, Serge

PY - 2018/12

Y1 - 2018/12

N2 - Distance-bounding protocols allow a verifier to both authenticate a prover and evaluate whether the latter is located in his vicinity. These protocols are of particular interest in contactless systems, e.g., electronic payment or access control systems, which are vulnerable to distance-based frauds. This survey analyzes and compares in a unified manner many existing distance-bounding protocols with respect to several key security and complexity features.

AB - Distance-bounding protocols allow a verifier to both authenticate a prover and evaluate whether the latter is located in his vicinity. These protocols are of particular interest in contactless systems, e.g., electronic payment or access control systems, which are vulnerable to distance-based frauds. This survey analyzes and compares in a unified manner many existing distance-bounding protocols with respect to several key security and complexity features.

KW - Contactless

KW - Cryptography

KW - Distance fraud

KW - Distance-bounding

KW - Information security

KW - Mafia fraud

KW - Proximity check

KW - Relay attacks

KW - Terrorist fraud

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M3 - RGC 21 - Publication in refereed journal

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JO - ACM Computing Surveys

JF - ACM Computing Surveys

IS - 5

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ER -

Security of Distance-Bounding: A Survey

Abstract

Research Keywords

UN SDGs

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