Risk aversion and optimal reserve prices in first- and second-price auctions
Research output: Journal Publications and Reviews › RGC 21 - Publication in refereed journal › peer-review
Author(s)
Detail(s)
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 1188-1202 |
| Journal / Publication | Journal of Economic Theory |
| Volume | 145 |
| Issue number | 3 |
| Online published | 18 Feb 2010 |
| Publication status | Published - May 2010 |
| Externally published | Yes |
Link(s)
Abstract
We analyze the effects of buyer and seller risk aversion in first- and second-price auctions in the classic setting of symmetric and independent private values. We show that the seller's optimal reserve price decreases in his own risk aversion, and more so in the first-price auction. The reserve price also decreases in the buyers' risk aversion in the first-price auction. Thus, greater risk aversion increases ex post efficiency in both auctions - especially that of the first-price auction. At the interim stage, the first-price auction is preferred by all buyer types in a lower interval, as well as by the seller.
Research Area(s)
- First-price auction, Reserve price, Risk aversion, Second-price auction
Citation Format(s)
Risk aversion and optimal reserve prices in first- and second-price auctions. / Hu, Audrey; Matthews, Steven A.; Zou, Liang.
In: Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 145, No. 3, 05.2010, p. 1188-1202.
In: Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 145, No. 3, 05.2010, p. 1188-1202.
Research output: Journal Publications and Reviews › RGC 21 - Publication in refereed journal › peer-review
