Revenue-sharing versus wholesale price mechanisms under different channel power structures

Kewen Pan; K. K. Lai; Stephen C.H. Leung; Di Xiao

doi:10.1016/j.ejor.2009.08.010

Revenue-sharing versus wholesale price mechanisms under different channel power structures

Kewen Pan, K. K. Lai, Stephen C.H. Leung, Di Xiao

Research output: Journal Publications and Reviews › RGC 21 - Publication in refereed journal › peer-review

210 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We consider a supply chain channel with two manufacturers and one retailer. Each manufacturer can choose either a wholesale price contract or a revenue-sharing contract with the retailer. We discuss and compare the results of two different types of contracts under different channel power structures, to check whether it is beneficial for manufacturers to use revenue-sharing contracts under different scenarios. Then we consider a supply chain channel with one manufacturer and two retailers. Each retailer can choose either a wholesale price contract or a revenue-sharing contract with the manufacturer. We analyze the likely outcomes under different scenarios to discover whether it is beneficial to use revenue-sharing contracts. Crown Copyright © 2009.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	532-538
Journal	European Journal of Operational Research
Volume	203
Issue number	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2009.08.010
Publication status	Published - 1 Jun 2010

Research Keywords

Game theory
Power structure
Pricing
Supply chain management

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title = "Revenue-sharing versus wholesale price mechanisms under different channel power structures",

abstract = "We consider a supply chain channel with two manufacturers and one retailer. Each manufacturer can choose either a wholesale price contract or a revenue-sharing contract with the retailer. We discuss and compare the results of two different types of contracts under different channel power structures, to check whether it is beneficial for manufacturers to use revenue-sharing contracts under different scenarios. Then we consider a supply chain channel with one manufacturer and two retailers. Each retailer can choose either a wholesale price contract or a revenue-sharing contract with the manufacturer. We analyze the likely outcomes under different scenarios to discover whether it is beneficial to use revenue-sharing contracts. Crown Copyright {\textcopyright} 2009.",

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AU - Pan, Kewen

AU - Lai, K. K.

AU - Leung, Stephen C.H.

AU - Xiao, Di

PY - 2010/6/1

Y1 - 2010/6/1

N2 - We consider a supply chain channel with two manufacturers and one retailer. Each manufacturer can choose either a wholesale price contract or a revenue-sharing contract with the retailer. We discuss and compare the results of two different types of contracts under different channel power structures, to check whether it is beneficial for manufacturers to use revenue-sharing contracts under different scenarios. Then we consider a supply chain channel with one manufacturer and two retailers. Each retailer can choose either a wholesale price contract or a revenue-sharing contract with the manufacturer. We analyze the likely outcomes under different scenarios to discover whether it is beneficial to use revenue-sharing contracts. Crown Copyright © 2009.

AB - We consider a supply chain channel with two manufacturers and one retailer. Each manufacturer can choose either a wholesale price contract or a revenue-sharing contract with the retailer. We discuss and compare the results of two different types of contracts under different channel power structures, to check whether it is beneficial for manufacturers to use revenue-sharing contracts under different scenarios. Then we consider a supply chain channel with one manufacturer and two retailers. Each retailer can choose either a wholesale price contract or a revenue-sharing contract with the manufacturer. We analyze the likely outcomes under different scenarios to discover whether it is beneficial to use revenue-sharing contracts. Crown Copyright © 2009.

KW - Game theory

KW - Power structure

KW - Pricing

KW - Supply chain management

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=70350702668&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - https://www.scopus.com/record/pubmetrics.uri?eid=2-s2.0-70350702668&origin=recordpage

U2 - 10.1016/j.ejor.2009.08.010

DO - 10.1016/j.ejor.2009.08.010

M3 - RGC 21 - Publication in refereed journal

SN - 0377-2217

VL - 203

SP - 532

EP - 538

JO - European Journal of Operational Research

JF - European Journal of Operational Research

IS - 2

ER -

Revenue-sharing versus wholesale price mechanisms under different channel power structures

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Research Keywords

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