Relational ties or customized contracts? An examination of alternative governance choices in China
Research output: Journal Publications and Reviews (RGC: 21, 22, 62) › 21_Publication in refereed journal › peer-review
Author(s)
Related Research Unit(s)
Detail(s)
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 526-534 |
Journal / Publication | Journal of International Business Studies |
Volume | 39 |
Issue number | 3 |
Publication status | Published - Apr 2008 |
Link(s)
Abstract
As business transactions become more complex in China - an increasingly market-driven economy - are managers more likely to employ relational ties or contracts? Consistent with the view that personal institutions govern transactions in China, our analysis of 361 buyer-supplier exchanges indicates that managers rely more on relational ties as asset specificity and uncertainty increase. We also find some support that impersonal institutions govern market transactions: as uncertainty increases, managers craft more customized contracts. Surprisingly, there is no association between contracts and asset specificity. These results hold for both local and foreign firms. © 2008 Academy of International Business All rights reserved.
Research Area(s)
- China, Emerging economies, Governance transitions, Legal contracts, Relational ties
Citation Format(s)
Relational ties or customized contracts? An examination of alternative governance choices in China. / Zhou, Kevin Zheng; Poppo, Laura; Yang, Zhilin.
In: Journal of International Business Studies, Vol. 39, No. 3, 04.2008, p. 526-534.Research output: Journal Publications and Reviews (RGC: 21, 22, 62) › 21_Publication in refereed journal › peer-review