TY - JOUR
T1 - Reconciling Hong Kong's Final Authority on Judicial Review with the Central Authorities in China
T2 - A Perspective from ‘One Country, Two Systems’
AU - Wang, Shucheng
PY - 2016/9/1
Y1 - 2016/9/1
N2 - Although the formula of “One Country, Two Systems” has been implemented since 1997, it is still controversial in terms of the role of Hong Kong’s final authority on judicial review under China’s sovereignty. The power of final adjudication is vested in the Court of Final Appeal in Hong Kong according to the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, but it is unclear whether the power extends to solving issues relating to Central Authorities within its jurisdiction. This article examines judicial review in Hong Kong and its relationship with Central Authorities in China, drawing on several cases to demonstrate that a constitutional tension exists. This tension actually results from a dual structure of constitutional review: one is the judicial review of the Basic Law by Hong Kong courts with the final authority on adjudication at the regional level, and the other is the constitutional control of the Basic Law by the National People’s Congress Standing Committee through interpretations at the national level. The article attempts to develop a theory of mutual deference, suggesting that each one should take a deferential approach so that a balance can be struck between “One Country” and “Two Systems”.
AB - Although the formula of “One Country, Two Systems” has been implemented since 1997, it is still controversial in terms of the role of Hong Kong’s final authority on judicial review under China’s sovereignty. The power of final adjudication is vested in the Court of Final Appeal in Hong Kong according to the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, but it is unclear whether the power extends to solving issues relating to Central Authorities within its jurisdiction. This article examines judicial review in Hong Kong and its relationship with Central Authorities in China, drawing on several cases to demonstrate that a constitutional tension exists. This tension actually results from a dual structure of constitutional review: one is the judicial review of the Basic Law by Hong Kong courts with the final authority on adjudication at the regional level, and the other is the constitutional control of the Basic Law by the National People’s Congress Standing Committee through interpretations at the national level. The article attempts to develop a theory of mutual deference, suggesting that each one should take a deferential approach so that a balance can be struck between “One Country” and “Two Systems”.
UR - http://sites.thomsonreuters.com.au/journals/files/2016/08/PLR-Vol-27-No-3-Contents.pdf
UR - https://sites.thomsonreuters.com.au/journals/2016/09/08/public-law-review-update-september-2016/
M3 - RGC 21 - Publication in refereed journal
SN - 1034-3024
VL - 27
SP - 218
EP - 231
JO - Public Law Review
JF - Public Law Review
IS - 3
ER -