Recent studies of agent incentives in internet resource allocation and pricing

Yukun Cheng; Xiaotie Deng; Dominik Scheder

doi:10.1007/s10288-018-0385-3

Recent studies of agent incentives in internet resource allocation and pricing

Yukun Cheng
, Xiaotie Deng
, Dominik Scheder

Research output: Journal Publications and Reviews › RGC 21 - Publication in refereed journal › peer-review

10 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Market makers choose and design market rules to serve certain objectives, such as to maximize revenue from the sales in the case of a single seller and multiple buyers. Given such rules, market participants play against each other to maximize their utility function values on goods acquired, possibly by hiding or misrepresenting their information needed in the implementation of market rules. Today’s Internet economy has changed the information collection process and may make some of the assumptions of market rule implementation obsolete. Here we make a fresh review of works on this challenge on the Internet where new economic systems operate. © 2018, Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany, part of Springer Nature.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	231-260
Journal	4OR
Volume	16
Issue number	3
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s10288-018-0385-3
Publication status	Published - 1 Sept 2018
Externally published	Yes

Bibliographical note

Publication details (e.g. title, author(s), publication statuses and dates) are captured on an “AS IS” and “AS AVAILABLE” basis at the time of record harvesting from the data source. Suggestions for further amendments or supplementary information can be sent to [email protected].

Funding

This research was partially supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Nos. 61632017, 61761146005, 71771161, 71471091). Dominik Scheder acknowledges support by the National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant 61502300.

Research Keywords

Algorithmic Game Theory
Auction
Incentive Ratio
Market equilibrium
Nash Equilibrium
Truthfulness

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Recent studies of agent incentives in internet resource allocation and pricing

Abstract

Bibliographical note

Funding

Research Keywords

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