Quantifying Cyber Attacks on Industrial MMC-HVDC Control System Using Structured Pseudospectrum

Tao Ding*, Ziyu Zeng, Boyu Qin, Junbo Zhao, Yongheng Yang, Frede Blaabjerg, Zhaoyang Dong

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Journal Publications and ReviewsRGC 21 - Publication in refereed journalpeer-review

29 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This letter assesses the impact of cyber-attacks on the control system of the modular multilevel converter (MMC)-based high-voltage dc (MMC-HVdc) transmission technology. Specifically, the small-signal model of the MMC-HVdc is characterized by a closed-loop matrix and the distance to the small-signal instability is then quantified by structured pseudospectrum. Furthermore, a vertical search method is proposed to quantify the boundary of the structured pseudospectrum. The proposed quantification model with the vertical search method can be extended to the control of other power electronics-based systems. Case studies on a two-terminal MMC-HVdc system verify the effectiveness of the qualification method. © 2020 IEEE.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)4915-4920
JournalIEEE Transactions on Power Electronics
Volume36
Issue number5
Online published21 Oct 2020
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - May 2021
Externally publishedYes

Research Keywords

  • cyber physical system
  • Cyberattacks
  • modular multilevel converter-based high-voltage dc (MMC-HVdc)
  • pseudospectrum
  • robust stability

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