Pricing policies under direct vs. indirect channel competition and national vs. store brand competition

Research output: Journal Publications and Reviews (RGC: 21, 22, 62)21_Publication in refereed journalpeer-review

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  • Hisashi Kurata
  • Dong-Qing Yao
  • John J. Liu


Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)262-281
Journal / PublicationEuropean Journal of Operational Research
Issue number1
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jul 2007
Externally publishedYes


This paper analyzes channel pricing in multiple distribution channels under competition between a national brand (NB) and a store brand (SB), where an NB can be distributed both through a direct channel (e-channel) and an indirect channel (local stores) but an SB can be distributed only through an indirect channel. We first explore cross-brand and cross-channel pricing policies. Formulating the problem as a Nash pricing game, we reach two findings: (1) brand loyalty building is profitable for both an NB and an SB; and (2) marketing decisions are more restrictive for an NB channel than they are for the SB channel. We next assess supply chain coordination and reach two findings: (1) wholesale price change does not coordinate the supply chain and (2) an appropriate combination of markup and markdown prices can achieve both supply chain coordination and a win-win outcome for each channel. © 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Research Area(s)

  • Brand management, Channel competition, Comparative statics, Pricing, Supply chain management