How bidder's number affects optimal reserve price in first-price auctions under risk aversion
Research output: Journal Publications and Reviews (RGC: 21, 22, 62) › 21_Publication in refereed journal › peer-review
Author(s)
Detail(s)
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 29-31 |
| Journal / Publication | Economics Letters |
| Volume | 113 |
| Issue number | 1 |
| Online published | 12 Jun 2011 |
| Publication status | Published - Oct 2011 |
| Externally published | Yes |
Link(s)
Abstract
This paper shows that in the classic symmetric and independent private value environments, the seller's optimal reserve price is a decreasing function of the number of bidders in the first-price auctions when the seller and/or buyers are risk averse.
Research Area(s)
- Bidder number, First-price auction, Independent private value, Reserve price, Risk aversion
Citation Format(s)
How bidder's number affects optimal reserve price in first-price auctions under risk aversion. / Hu, Audrey.
In: Economics Letters, Vol. 113, No. 1, 10.2011, p. 29-31.Research output: Journal Publications and Reviews (RGC: 21, 22, 62) › 21_Publication in refereed journal › peer-review
