MONEY AND FAME : VIVIDNESS EFFECTS IN THE NATIONAL BASKETBALL ASSOCIATION
Research output: Chapters, Conference Papers, Creative and Literary Works (RGC: 12, 32, 41, 45) › 32_Refereed conference paper (with ISBN/ISSN) › peer-review
Author(s)
Detail(s)
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Title of host publication | Academy of Management Proceedings |
| Publisher | Academy of Management |
| Volume | 2008 |
| Publication status | Published - Aug 2008 |
| Externally published | Yes |
Conference
| Title | 2008 Academy of Management Annual Meeting |
|---|---|
| Place | United States |
| City | Anaheim |
| Period | 8 - 13 August 2008 |
Link(s)
Abstract
The present paper directly tests Kerr’ (1975) s proposal by investigating whether, how and why highly visible behaviors are over-rewarded and less visible, but similarly (or more) important behaviors are under-rewarded. Findings from three studies demonstrated that scorers were rewarded with higher salaries and received more support in the NBA All-Star balloting than defenders, even though they might not necessarily make more contribution than their teammates.
Research Area(s)
- Compensation, Judgment and decision making, Vividness
Citation Format(s)
MONEY AND FAME : VIVIDNESS EFFECTS IN THE NATIONAL BASKETBALL ASSOCIATION. / Wang, Long.
Academy of Management Proceedings. Vol. 2008 Academy of Management, 2008.Research output: Chapters, Conference Papers, Creative and Literary Works (RGC: 12, 32, 41, 45) › 32_Refereed conference paper (with ISBN/ISSN) › peer-review
