MONEY AND FAME : VIVIDNESS EFFECTS IN THE NATIONAL BASKETBALL ASSOCIATION

Research output: Chapters, Conference Papers, Creative and Literary Works (RGC: 12, 32, 41, 45)32_Refereed conference paper (with ISBN/ISSN)peer-review

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Author(s)

Detail(s)

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationAcademy of Management Proceedings
PublisherAcademy of Management
Volume2008
Publication statusPublished - Aug 2008
Externally publishedYes

Conference

Title2008 Academy of Management Annual Meeting
PlaceUnited States
CityAnaheim
Period8 - 13 August 2008

Abstract

The present paper directly tests Kerr’ (1975) s proposal by investigating whether, how and why highly visible behaviors are over-rewarded and less visible, but similarly (or more) important behaviors are under-rewarded. Findings from three studies demonstrated that scorers were rewarded with higher salaries and received more support in the NBA All-Star balloting than defenders, even though they might not necessarily make more contribution than their teammates.

Research Area(s)

  • Compensation, Judgment and decision making, Vividness

Citation Format(s)

MONEY AND FAME : VIVIDNESS EFFECTS IN THE NATIONAL BASKETBALL ASSOCIATION. / Wang, Long.

Academy of Management Proceedings. Vol. 2008 Academy of Management, 2008.

Research output: Chapters, Conference Papers, Creative and Literary Works (RGC: 12, 32, 41, 45)32_Refereed conference paper (with ISBN/ISSN)peer-review