Fighting collusion in auctions : An experimental investigation
Research output: Journal Publications and Reviews (RGC: 21, 22, 62) › 21_Publication in refereed journal › peer-review
Author(s)
Detail(s)
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 84-96 |
| Journal / Publication | International Journal of Industrial Organization |
| Volume | 29 |
| Issue number | 1 |
| Online published | 11 Jul 2009 |
| Publication status | Published - Jan 2011 |
| Externally published | Yes |
Link(s)
Abstract
The danger of collusion presents a serious challenge for auctioneers. In this paper, we compare the collusive properties of two standard auctions, the English auction and the first-price sealed-bid auction, and a lesser-known format, the Amsterdam (second-price) auction. In the Amsterdam auction, the highest losing bidder earns a premium for stirring up the price. We study two settings: in one, all bidders can collude, and in another, only a subset is eligible. The experiments show that the Amsterdam auction triggers less collusion than the standard auctions. We compare experimental results to theoretical predictions, and provide an explanation where they differ.
Research Area(s)
- Auctions, Collusion, Laboratory experiment
Citation Format(s)
Fighting collusion in auctions : An experimental investigation. / Hu, Audrey; Offerman, Theo; Onderstal, Sander.
In: International Journal of Industrial Organization, Vol. 29, No. 1, 01.2011, p. 84-96.Research output: Journal Publications and Reviews (RGC: 21, 22, 62) › 21_Publication in refereed journal › peer-review
