The oversight role of regulators : evidence from SEC comment letters in the IPO process

Research output: Journal Publications and Reviews (RGC: 21, 22, 62)21_Publication in refereed journalNot applicablepeer-review

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Detail(s)

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1229-1260
Journal / PublicationReview of Accounting Studies
Volume22
Issue number3
Early online date29 May 2017
Publication statusPublished - 1 Sep 2017

Abstract

This study investigates how regulatory oversight affects the price formation of initial public offerings (IPOs). We provide evidence on the oversight role of the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) by examining the effects of comment letters issued by the SEC in the process through which companies are initially listed. We find that IPO issuers reduce their offer price if they receive comment letters. The reduction in price from the IPO filing date to the final issue date is greater when the IPO firm has more correspondence with the SEC. The pricing impact of SEC comment letters is more pronounced for IPO issuers with greater hyping incentives. Moreover, we find that IPO firms that receive more comment letters have similar levels of underpricing and outperform over the long run after the issue date, compared with IPOs with fewer comment letters.

Research Area(s)

  • Disclosure, Hyping, Information asymmetry, Price formation, SEC comment letters