Does analysts coverage curb executives’ excess perks? Evidence from Chinese listed firms

Research output: Journal Publications and Reviews (RGC: 21, 22, 62)21_Publication in refereed journalpeer-review

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Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)329-343
Number of pages15
Journal / PublicationAsia - Pacific Journal of Accounting & Economics
Issue number2
Online published1 Jun 2020
Publication statusPublished - 2022


In this study, we explore the causal relationship between analyst coverage and executives’ excess perquisites by using manually collected data from Chinese listed firms. Empirical results show that analyst following has a negative effect on excess perks. This result still holds when we use alternative measure of excess perquisites, utilize alternative regression methodology, and address endogenous problems. Furthermore, we find that the analysts’ monitoring effect is more pronounced when corruption is more severe. Finally, we find that the effect substitutes the monitoring function by large shareholders and Big 4 auditors.

Research Area(s)

  • analyst coverage, excess perks, Big 4 auditors, corruption, large shareholders