Contract governance and buyer-supplier conflict : The moderating role of institutions

Research output: Journal Publications and Reviews (RGC: 21, 22, 62)21_Publication in refereed journalpeer-review

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Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)12-24
Journal / PublicationJournal of Operations Management
Issue number1
Online published24 Nov 2015
Publication statusPublished - Jan 2016


Drawing on contract governance literature and institutional theory, this study investigates the differential effects of output- and behavior-based contract governance on buyer-supplier conflict in supply chains. The authors develop a contingent perspective to examine how institutional factors moderate the impact of contract governance. The findings, from an empirical study of buyer-supplier dyads in China, show that an output-based contract is negatively, whereas a behavior-based contract is positively, related to buyer-supplier conflict. The effects of a contract are moderated by two primary institutional factors: legal enforceability and unilateral government support. These findings have important implications for supply chain research, public policy, and managerial practice.

Research Area(s)

  • Behavior-based contract, Conflict, Institution theory, Legal enforceability, Output-based contract, Unilateral government support