Individual Learning in Normal Form Games : Some Laboratory Results

Research output: Journal Publications and Reviews (RGC: 21, 22, 62)21_Publication in refereed journalNot applicablepeer-review

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Detail(s)

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)46-76
Journal / PublicationGames and Economic Behavior
Volume19
Issue number1
StatePublished - Apr 1997
Externally publishedYes

Abstract

We propose and test a simple belief learning model. We find considerable heterogeneity across individual players; some players are well described by fictitious play (long memory) learning, other players by Cournot (short memory) learning, and some players are in between. Representative agent versions of the model fit significantly less well and sometimes point to incorrect inferences. The model tracks players' behavior well across a variety of payoff matrices and information conditions.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: C72, C73, C92, D83. © 1997 Academic Press.

Citation Format(s)

Individual Learning in Normal Form Games : Some Laboratory Results. / Cheung, Yin-Wong; Friedman, Daniel.

In: Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 19, No. 1, 04.1997, p. 46-76.

Research output: Journal Publications and Reviews (RGC: 21, 22, 62)21_Publication in refereed journalNot applicablepeer-review