The role of investment banker directors in M&A
Research output: Journal Publications and Reviews (RGC: 21, 22, 62) › 21_Publication in refereed journal › peer-review
Author(s)
Related Research Unit(s)
Detail(s)
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 269-286 |
| Journal / Publication | Journal of Financial Economics |
| Volume | 112 |
| Issue number | 2 |
| Online published | 10 Feb 2014 |
| Publication status | Published - May 2014 |
Link(s)
Abstract
We examine how directors with investment banking experience affect firms' acquisition behavior. We find that firms with investment bankers on the board have a higher probability of making acquisitions. Furthermore, acquirers with investment banker directors experience higher announcement returns, pay lower takeover premiums and advisory fees, and exhibit superior long-run performance. Overall, our results suggest that directors with investment banking experience help firms make better acquisitions, both by identifying suitable targets and by reducing the cost of the deals. © 2014 Elsevier B.V.
Research Area(s)
- Board of directors, Investment banking experience, Mergers and acquisitions
Citation Format(s)
The role of investment banker directors in M&A. / Huang, Qianqian; Jiang, Feng; Lie, Erik et al.
In: Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 112, No. 2, 05.2014, p. 269-286.Research output: Journal Publications and Reviews (RGC: 21, 22, 62) › 21_Publication in refereed journal › peer-review
